Gentian Cloud OS — Security Architecture

Architecture reference. The normative one-page rules are security/principles.md; §3.0 lists the controls in place. Scope: identity, authorization, and isolation for a fully cloud-based, Kubernetes-native cloud OS.

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1. Purpose

Gentian needs an identity and access layer that is (a) simpler and more modern than traditional directory-centric stacks, (b) fully open-source and self-hosted, (c) first-class for two principal types — humans and applications/workloads — and (d) designed so that a compromised principal of any type does the least possible damage.

This document explains the models behind the principles, the concrete Keycloak + OpenFGA architecture, and how application permissions are modeled (profile declaration, IntegrationBinding wiring, and AppGrant ReBAC layer).

The guiding idea, borrowed from Android's sandbox model: least privilege is not a single access-control model — it is the intersection of several independent layers, each enforcing a different concern, so that breaching one layer does not collapse the others.

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2. Security principles

The nine normative rules are in security/principles.md. This section is the reasoning they rest on.

2.1 Core principle — defense in depth as an intersection

Android's "a compromised app can do little" property does not come from one mechanism. It comes from stacking independent enforcement layers: kernel DAC (each app is its own UID, owns its own files), a capability manifest (declared + granted permissions), and SELinux MAC (a system-wide label policy that even root cannot override). An app's effective reach is the intersection of sandbox ∩ granted permissions ∩ mandatory policy.

Gentian ports the layering, not any single model. Each access-control model is assigned to the layer it is best at:

Layer	Model	Job	Android analogue
Mandatory isolation backbone	MAC	Tenant boundaries, default-deny egress in tenant namespaces — true regardless of any authZ config	SELinux + inet GID
Authorization plane	ReBAC	Fine-grained "who may touch which resource," sharing, delegation	Binder caller-UID checks + file ownership
Ergonomic grouping	RBAC	Human-friendly bundles of grants	Permission groups

Rule: MAC is the backbone, ReBAC is the authorization plane, and RBAC is an ergonomic veneer over ReBAC. Effective access = the intersection of all layers; the most restrictive layer wins.

2.2 The composition principle

Android composes identity: effectiveUID = androidUserId × 100000 + appId. The same app in a work profile vs. a personal profile gets two different sandboxes.

Gentian generalizes this to a principal chain:

tenant T  →  human U

Each layer checks its slice:

• Tenant T isolation is MAC (namespaces, network policy).
• Human U rights are a ReBAC ceiling.

Effective permission = the intersection of the whole chain.

2.4 Blast-radius containment per principal type

Compromised human user — ReBAC confines to actual relationships; MAC guarantees the tenant boundary holds regardless of tuple errors; short sessions cap the window.

Compromised app/workload — namespace isolation (the UID sandbox); default-deny egress; admission control blocking privilege escalation at deploy time (SELinux confining even privileged domains).

2.5 The shared MariaDB server — what an app's account can do

One MariaDB server (system-mariadb) holds the databases of every tenant's MariaDB apps. An app gets one account on it, <tenant>_<app>@%, with a password of its own from the vault. As implemented (internal/backup/mariadb.go, verified against the pinned server image by TestMariaDBAgainstAServer):

• It can do anything inside its provisioned database. If its profile sets allowDynamicDatabaseCreation, it can also create, use and drop databases named <database>_…, and do anything inside them.
• It cannot read, write, create or drop a database of any other name — including one that differs only where its own name has an underscore, or only in case. It holds no privilege on the server: no GRANT OPTION, CREATE USER, SUPER, PROCESS, FILE, RELOAD, SHUTDOWN, SHOW DATABASES or replication privilege, so it cannot make or change accounts, pass its rights on, read other sessions, read or write the server's files, or see databases it has no rights on.
• Two apps cannot be given overlapping rights. A provisioned database's name can fall under another app's <database>_ prefix, because hyphens in tenant and app names become underscores. Provisioning refuses the app that would create the overlap (operations.md §9.3).

What it does not cover:

• No transport encryption is required of an app's connection (no REQUIRE SSL, and the server does not set require_secure_transport); the account's host is %.
• Connections are the only resource limit. The account holds at most requires.services.database.connectionLimit connections at once (MAX_USER_CONNECTIONS; 25 when the profile names none, at most 100), so one app cannot take every connection of the shared server. An app's PostgreSQL role is held to the same number (CONNECTION LIMIT). Its queries are not limited: one app's load still slows the others.
• The network keeps an app to the server it declared, and no further. A tenant's namespace denies egress by default. An app's kernel-access policy opens the server of the engine its profile declares, on that engine's port: system-mariadb on 3306 for a MariaDB app, system-postgresql on 5432 for a PostgreSQL one, and nothing of the other. So an app in a tenant's namespace that declared no MariaDB database cannot reach the MariaDB server at all. The server's side keeps out the rest: its own policy admits tenant namespaces and the platform's named clients, and no other pod of the cluster (§2.7). Among the apps that do reach the server, the account's rights above are the only boundary between tenants.
• The admin credential (mariadb-admin, root) is held by the operator's Jobs in system-mariadb and is not an app's.

2.6 What a declared store opens

A tenant's namespace denies egress by default. Policy kernel-access-<app> (internal/kernel/netpolicy/kernel.go) opens, for the app's pods, what its profile declares under requires.services:

The profile declares	Opened
database, engine postgresql (the default)	system-postgresql, TCP 5432
database, engine mariadb	system-mariadb, TCP 3306
cache, engine redis (the default)	system-cache, TCP 6379
cache, engine memcached	Nothing in the system tier. The tenant's own Memcached, TCP 11211, in the tenant's namespace (policies tenant-cache-egress and -ingress, which name only the apps that declared Memcached)
storage.s3	system-s3, TCP 9000
storage.files alone	Nothing: another app serves the files
mail	system-mail and system-mail-dmz, every port. Not narrowed on the app's side: where an app's mail goes depends on the cluster's mail mode. The servers' side is: the proxy in the DMZ admits its three listeners, and the mail servers admit a tenant's pod on 587, 143 and 993 only (§2.8)
identity	The edge and the identity provider's namespace, every port. Not narrowed
llm	system-llm, TCP 4000: the model gateway, and nothing else in its namespace

One engine opens nothing of the other. The ports are the ones the app is handed with its credentials (internal/controller/provisioner), and a test holds the store charts to them. A namespace named in the gentianos.io/kernel-egress-namespaces annotation of a profile of trust tier platform is opened whole, beside these (below that tier the annotation is ignored); a profile that declares llm has no reason left to name system-llm there, and one that does opens the gateway's database, cache and model servers to its own egress as well (the gateway's side, §2.9, still refuses it on those ports). This is egress from the tenant's namespace; who a store admits is §2.7, who the model gateway admits §2.9.

The model gateway is a declared requirement. An app whose profile declares requires.services.llm is given a key at the gateway, the Secret llm-credentials-<app> and the rule above; an app that does not is given none of the three, on any cluster (internal/controller/model_access_reconciler.go). The key is generated per tenant and app the way a database password is -- derived from the master by the vault's seeder, or random without one -- kept in the vault at the app's path, and known to the gateway by its hash; nothing about it follows from the tenant's and the app's names.

2.7 Who may reach a shared store

Each of the four shared stores carries one NetworkPolicy, store-ingress, on its server's pods. It is delivered by the engine's own chart (templates/networkpolicy.yaml in kernel/data/tenant-postgres and kernel/services/infra-{mariadb,redis,seaweedfs}/manifests), in the Argo CD sync that brings the values the server is installed from, so a server is never up without it. A connection is admitted from the sources below, on the port named, and from nowhere else.

Server	Port	Admitted
PostgreSQL, system-postgresql	5432	tenant namespaces; pods of system-postgresql itself (the role and destroy Jobs, the cluster's own replicas); the operator's pods in kernel-control (a tenant's usage history and notices). The dump and load of a backup and a restore run in system-postgresql itself, where the administrator's Secret is
	8000	CloudNativePG's operator in kernel-data, which asks each instance for its state
MariaDB, system-mariadb	3306	tenant namespaces; pods of system-mariadb itself (the setup and destroy Jobs, and the dump and load of a backup and a restore)
Redis, system-cache	6379	tenant namespaces; pods of system-cache itself (the ACL and destroy Jobs)
SeaweedFS, system-s3	9000 (S3)	tenant namespaces (apps, and the volume capture and restore pods, which run where the claim is); pods of system-s3 itself (the bucket and destroy Jobs, the capture and restore of a bucket, a bundle's manifest); pods labeled gentianos.io/component=tenant-export in system-postgresql, system-mariadb, the identity namespace, system-mail (the copy of a tenant's mailboxes, beside the mail server's volume) and kernel-data (the desktop database of the tenant that adopts the kernel realm, beside the kernel's PostgreSQL), which are the steps of a backup and a restore that run beside their own service and write to or read from the bundle; the operator's pods in kernel-control (a bundle's manifest, download and import)

SeaweedFS's master and filer gRPC ports (19333, 18888) are mutual TLS: they accept a connection only with a certificate of the internal CA (§12.4) whose common name is the server's own (seaweedfs-server) or the administering Jobs' (seaweedfs-shell); the volume server's and the S3 gateway's gRPC accept only the server's. Whoever holds the Jobs' certificate can make and delete buckets and identities and read every object. The ports are admitted only from pods of system-s3 labeled gentianos.io/object-store-shell=true, the platform's bucket Job, destroy Job and a bucket's restore, which administer the store with weed shell; those pods alone mount the client certificate (seaweedfs-shell-tls) and read the filer's signing key, which the filer requires a token of on its identity API. A volume server refuses a write or a read without a token the master signed, and the filer's HTTP port one the filer or the S3 gateway signed; the keys are random, in the vault at gentian-os/kernel/storage/s3/jwt, and reach the server only by secretKeyRef from an ExternalSecret in system-s3. The master's HTTP port has no check of its own (weed's all-in-one server binds it on every address, which weed shell needs); the NetworkPolicy is its only guard. An app's isolation from another app's bucket is its key: one identity per bucket, named after it, allowed Read, Write, List and Tagging on that bucket alone, never Admin. The key pair reaches the Job that makes the identity (the bucket Job, and a bucket's restore) in a Secret of the Job's name beside it in system-s3, owned by the Job and collected with it; the Job reads it with secretKeyRef, and it is in no Job spec, no provisioning ConfigMap and no composed Object. An app's PostgreSQL role, MariaDB user and cache user passwords, and the OIDC client secret of an app whose Keycloak client an operator Job makes, reach their Jobs the same way, each in a Secret of its Job's name, in its Job's namespace, owned by the Job. The object store's administrator is s3-admin, its key derived under s3.

Closed, deliberately: PostgreSQL's metrics port (9187), and SeaweedFS's master and filer HTTP ports and its volume server's ports (reached inside the pod only; the kubelet's probes come from the node). Nothing the platform runs uses them; a cluster that brings a Prometheus adds a policy of its own selecting the same pods, since policies add up.

The rule has two sides, and neither is enough alone. A server cannot tell one tenant's app from another's pod, so its policy admits every namespace labeled gentianos.io/tier=tenant. It keeps out everything that is not a tenant namespace or a client named above: the kernel's other namespaces, the other system namespaces, a tenant's DMZ, a namespace outside the layout. What keeps out an app that declared no such store is the tenant's side (§2.6): tenant-isolation denies egress for every pod of a tenant's namespace -- the platform tenant's and a single-tenancy cluster's user tenant included, since both are Tenants and the same reconcile writes it -- and kernel-access-<app> opens one store's port for the app that declared it. Two things on that side are wider than a declaring app: a component with a database requirement (the desktop) is opened the whole of system-postgresql, which the server narrows to 5432, and a capture pod (gentian-tenant-export) is opened the three stores a bundle can hold. A capture or restore pod has no way out of the cluster from that policy. A run whose bundle is at an external destination, and that has a step in the tenant's namespace (a volume), is given a policy of its own, gentian-<export|restore>-destination-<run>, selecting its own pods only, owned by the run and removed when it ends: egress to the destination's port (the endpoint's, or 443/80 by its scheme), to its address alone when the endpoint names one, and to any address on that port when it names a host by name -- a NetworkPolicy matches addresses, and a rule by name would need a CNI's own extension. A fetch of a bundle from a declared bundle source (storage outside the cluster an import reads from) runs as a Job in system-s3 and is given gentian-fetch-source-<fetch>, owned by its Job, made before the Job is let run (it is created suspended) and deleted when it ends: egress to the source's address and port in the same form, to system-s3 itself and to DNS, and nowhere else -- in a namespace that otherwise restricts no egress, this policy is what confines the pod. A fetch from a bucket of the cluster's own storage is given no way out at all. The source's keys are the custodian's to set (requirement bundle-source-<name>, vault gentian-os/kernel/backup/sources/<name>, written by the cluster's administrators only; for a tenant's own store, <tenant>.<name> with spec.tenant, which its exports write to, gentian-os/tenants/<t>/backup/sources/<name>, written by that tenant's administrators and read by ESO under the tenants/+/backup/* grant that already excludes the escrowed identity) and reach the Job by secretKeyRef from the ExternalSecret bundle-source-<name> in system-s3; nobody names a source's address or Secret in a request: a bundle is named by source and prefix and the operator finds both. Listing a source and reading a bundle's manifest are the operator's own reads, from kernel-control, as for any destination.

A pod of the server's own namespace is admitted without a label. The operator's Jobs there carry none on their pods, and a pod there can mount the store's admin Secret, so a label would keep nobody out. The boundary is who may create a pod in a system namespace.

What this does not cover:

• The other servers. The kernel's own PostgreSQL and the mail servers have a policy each (§2.8), and so has each server of the model gateway's namespace (§2.9); what those leave open is said there.
• Kernel and system namespaces deny no egress. A pod in one of them is kept from a store by the store's policy, from a kernel namespace by that namespace's rules (§2.13), and on the way out by nothing.
• A tenant's DMZ namespace has no default deny. Its proxies carry their own policies -- out to the one component, in from the Gateway's Envoy pods (§2.14); the stores do not admit that tier.
• A CNI that does not enforce NetworkPolicy makes all of this a description. The kubelet's probes are unaffected either way: traffic from a pod's own node is not subject to a NetworkPolicy.

The clients are written down once, in scripts/tests/store-clients.yaml. make test-store-network-policies renders each policy and each engine and asserts every client is admitted, every entry it says to refuse is refused, and every port a server's pods declare is listed or recorded as closed; a Go test holds the file to the code that builds each client (internal/controller/store_clients_test.go). A new client of a store is added there first.

One switch turns the four off: storeNetworkPolicies on the bootstrap chart, which the installer sets from STORE_NETWORK_POLICIES (default true). Off leaves credentials as the only check on a connection.

2.8 Who may reach the kernel's PostgreSQL and the mail servers

Three more servers carry a NetworkPolicy of the same kind, each in its own chart and synced before the server it selects (sync wave -1). The same switch turns them off.

kernel-postgres, in kernel-data (kernel/data/kernel-postgres/templates/networkpolicy.yaml, policy kernel-postgres-ingress). It holds Keycloak's database, OpenFGA's, the registrar's record and the desktop's database of the tenant that adopts the kernel realm.

Port	Admitted
5432	the authentication namespace (Keycloak); the authorization namespace (OpenFGA, whose migration runs as an init container of its own pod); in kernel-control, the registrar's and the operator's pods by label, and no other pod there -- the operator reads and writes the usage history and the notices of the tenant that adopts the kernel realm; tenant namespaces, for that tenant's desktop; pods of kernel-data itself (the cluster's replicas and join Jobs, and CloudNativePG's operator)
8000	CloudNativePG's operator, in kernel-data, which asks each instance for its state

Closed: the metrics port (9187). Not admitted: Argo CD, Crossplane and its providers, the vault, the edge, the director, the usher, the custodian, the system namespaces, a tenant's DMZ.

• The two identity namespaces are admitted whole. Keycloak's and OpenFGA's pods are built by upstream charts the identity ApplicationSet installs at a version its values may move, and a pod of either namespace can mount the database Secret there.
• Tenant namespaces are admitted by tier, not by name. Which tenant keeps its desktop's database here is decided by its realm (componentDatabaseNamespace), so no namespace can be named. The tenant's side is what narrows it, as for a store: egress is denied by default, and only that one tenant's desktop is opened kernel-data.
• CloudNativePG's operator is not selected by this policy. It runs in kernel-data beside the cluster; the namespace's own rule (§2.13) leaves its webhook port open to any source, because the API server calls it from no pod, and closes its metrics port.
• Switched off, this one policy is kept and admits everything rather than being removed: the Application that syncs the chart does not prune, so a policy that merely stopped being rendered would stay in force.

Mail: Dovecot and Postfix in system-mail, and the proxy in front of them in system-mail-dmz (templates/networkpolicy.yaml in kernel/services/dovecot/manifests, kernel/services/postfix/manifests and kernel/services/mail-edge/manifests; policies dovecot-ingress, postfix-ingress and mail-edge). They exist only on a cluster whose mail.serviceMode is system; a cluster that relays its mail runs none of the three and has none of the policies.

Nothing in system-mail is reachable from outside the cluster: both servers' Services are ClusterIP. The one load balancer for mail is in the DMZ, in front of a proxy (HAProxy, TCP only) that takes 25, 587 and 993 and opens each connection again to the server it belongs to. What the proxy is and is not is in mail.md §9b.

Every flow of the two namespaces. The first three rows are the only ones that begin outside the cluster.

From	To	Port	Held by
Any address: mail servers and mail clients on the internet, through the load balancer	the proxy	25, 587, 993 (the pod's 2525, 2587, 2993)	mail-edge, ingress, no source named
A tenant's app that declared mail, dialing mail.<kernelDomain> or imap.<kernelDomain>	the proxy	587, 993	the same rule; the app's side is kernel-access-<app>
Keycloak, sending a realm's mail to mail.<kernelDomain>	the proxy	587	the same rule
The proxy	Postfix	10025 (inbound mail), 10587 (submission), TCP, each connection behind a PROXY-protocol header	mail-edge egress; postfix-ingress admits the proxy's pods, by the DMZ's name and their labels, and nothing else there
The proxy	Dovecot	10993 (IMAPS), TCP, behind a PROXY-protocol header	mail-edge egress; dovecot-ingress likewise
The proxy	the cluster's resolver	53, UDP and TCP	mail-edge egress, no destination named
A pod of a tenant namespace, by the Service's name	Postfix	587	postfix-ingress, namespaces labeled gentianos.io/tier=tenant
A pod of a tenant namespace, by the Service's name	Dovecot	143, 993	dovecot-ingress, the same
Postfix	Dovecot	24 (LMTP), 12345 (authentication service)	dovecot-ingress, Postfix's pods
The installer's check, in system-mail, labeled gentianos.io/purpose=verify	Dovecot	24, 143	dovecot-ingress
Postfix	mail servers on the internet	25	no policy: egress from system-mail is not restricted
Postfix	the relay host, where the claim names one	the relay's port (587 unless set)	no policy
Postfix, Dovecot	the cluster's resolver	53	no policy
Dovecot	Keycloak, in kernel-authentication, to introspect a sign-in token	8080	no policy on Dovecot's side
The kubelet, from the pod's node	the proxy's health endpoint (8404), Dovecot's 24		not subject to a NetworkPolicy

Closed, though something listens: Postfix's 25 (mail from outside arrives on 10025, and nothing inside the cluster is handed 25) and the proxy's health port. The proxy is the only pod of the two namespaces whose egress is restricted: it can reach the three PROXY-protocol ports and a resolver, and nothing else in any namespace or on the internet.

Control	Detail
No Service of system-mail is a load balancer or a node port; the only listener that faces the internet is the proxy's, in system-mail-dmz	—
The proxy holds no mail, no user database, no certificate and no key, mounts no Secret and carries no service-account token; it runs as an ordinary user with no capability on a read-only filesystem	—
TLS ends at Postfix and Dovecot: the proxy passes STARTTLS and implicit TLS through unread	—
The servers see the client's address, not the proxy's: each connection carries it in a PROXY-protocol header, which Postfix and Dovecot read on ports of their own and require there	Proven against the real images in local containers (make test-mail-edge-lab)
A pod of the cluster cannot give itself another address: the ports that believe a PROXY header admit the proxy's pods alone, and the ports pods use take no header	And only as good as the CNI's enforcement of NetworkPolicy
Per client address: at most 20 connections at once and 60 a minute on 25 and on 587, 100 and 120 on 993, counted by each proxy replica; over that the connection is closed and logged	—
The proxy can reach nothing but the three PROXY-protocol ports and DNS	—
Egress from system-mail	Not restricted. Postfix has to reach port 25 of any address; no policy says so and none denies the rest
The client's address behind a load balancer that is itself a proxy (an Octavia amphora)	A setting, off by default, that no claim field sets. loadBalancer.proxyProtocol on the mail-edge chart makes the proxy take a PROXY header from the load balancer's addresses and from nobody else. Without it, on such a load balancer, every client is the load balancer's address

What stays open, and why:

• The proxy admits any source on its three ports. A connection through the load balancer arrives from an address that is no pod's, and one from a pod that dialed the public name arrives from wherever the cluster's proxy mode puts it. The credential is the check on 587 and 993; on 25 it is Postfix's rule that it relays for nobody it does not know.
• A broken-into proxy can lie about a client's address to the two servers, on those three ports, and can do nothing else. It could name an address inside the pod range, which Postfix lets relay without a credential unless submission.requireAuthentication is set on the Postfix chart; with that set, an address buys nothing.
• A tenant's pod reaches Postfix's 587 and Dovecot's 143 and 993 by the Service's name, and no other namespace's pod does. The operator hands out the public names, so these are a fallback; which pods use them cannot be read from this repository.
• DNS egress names no destination, as everywhere in this repository: where a cluster's resolver is differs by cluster.

The clients of all three are in the servers section of scripts/tests/store-clients.yaml, each marked proven or inferred; make test-store-network-policies holds the policies to it and holds the proxy's configuration, its egress rules and the servers' listeners to each other (scripts/tests/server_network_policies.py), and a Go test holds the table to the operator's code (internal/controller/server_clients_test.go). Where the operator writes each object a mail server mounts is held to the chart that mounts it by internal/controller/mail_objects_test.go.

2.9 Who may reach the model gateway

On a cluster that serves models, system-llm holds four pod sets that listen, and each carries a NetworkPolicy of its own. They are delivered with the gateway's chart (kernel/services/llm/manifests/templates/networkpolicy.yaml) in sync wave -1, before the servers, under the same switch as the stores' (storeNetworkPolicies).

Server	Policy	Port	Admitted
The gateway (LiteLLM)	llm-gateway-ingress	4000	tenant namespaces; the operator's pods in kernel-control (an app's or a desktop's key, a tenant's team, a purge); and, only where the claim switches the console on (llm.console.enabled), the Gateway's Envoy pods in the edge namespace (the console llm.<kernelDomain>, a kernel console behind the kernel session)
Its PostgreSQL (CloudNativePG)	llm-database-ingress	5432	the gateway's pods; the cluster's own pods (a replica or join Job, when instances is raised)
		8000	CloudNativePG's operator in kernel-data
Its Redis	llm-cache-ingress	6379	the gateway's pods
The mock model server (clusters without GPUs)	llm-mock-ingress	8000	the gateway's pods

The console has a switch, and it is off by default. spec.llm.console.enabled on the Cluster claim decides whether llm.<kernelDomain> exists. Off, there is no route, no published host and no rule for the edge in llm-gateway-ingress: the gateway is reachable by its in-cluster clients alone, which is what "system services have no public route" asks. On, the route is composed behind the kernel session for whoever may configure the cluster (can_configure, kernel_gateway_routes.go), the edge's Envoy pods are admitted to port 4000, and the route carries the gateway's whole API as well as its pages; that is a departure from the rule which the cluster's owner takes by writing the setting. The operator reads the setting from the claim and falls back to nothing: a cluster whose claim does not state it has no console, and the installer says so in one line. On this route the edge leaves the Authorization header to the console, whose pages send LiteLLM's own key there, and hands LiteLLM no token of the platform's; the session is shown to the bouncer by its ID token, as on Keycloak's administration console. The policy rule is rendered by the gateway's chart from the same field of the claim, which the chart is handed as a values file: a commit that changes the setting changes the route and the rule, each at its own sync and with no run of the install; in between, a route without the rule answers nothing (llms.md).

The gateway's image is a named release. kernel/services/llm/manifests/values.yaml names LiteLLM by tag and digest. make lint-image-pins fails on an image under kernel/, charts/ or crossplane/ that names latest, and on the gateway's image written without its digest, in the values and in the rendered chart. One latest is known and listed there: the fallback tag of a real vLLM instance.

The database's metrics port (9187) is closed. The rule for the gateway has the same two sides as a store's: its policy admits every tenant namespace, and the tenant's side (§2.6) opens port 4000 for the apps that declared the gateway and for no other. Unlike a store, no pod of system-llm itself is admitted to the gateway: nothing there is its client.

The desktop is a client of the gateway, for the assistant on it. Its profile declares the gateway as an app's does, optionally, and the operator serves it per tenant (internal/controller/model_access_reconciler.go): a key generated in the vault for this tenant's desktop alone, registered under the alias <tenant>-desktop, delivered in the Secret llm-credentials-desktop of the tenant's namespace, and written on the tenant's record so that deleting the tenant with its data removes it. The desktop's chart is told the gateway's address and that Secret's name; the key is in no release value and no Component. The desktop's pods reach port 4000 of system-llm by a rule of component-desktop, written once the key is delivered, and nothing else in that namespace. The platform tenant's desktop is served the same way -- its namespace is a tenant-tier namespace like any other. What this leaves:

• The key is the tenant's desktop's, not a person's. Every member who can open the desktop calls models with it; the gateway sees one key per tenant's desktop and, at most, the name the desktop passes along with a request.
• No budget is attached. The gateway knows a team per tenant, and neither an app's key nor the desktop's is attached to it, so a tenant's spend is not capped at the gateway by this.
• A profile below platform trust cannot have this. The API server refuses a placed profile that declares the gateway at another tier, and the reconciler refuses one that asks for the key as a chart value.

The clients are the store: llm rows of scripts/tests/store-clients.yaml, each naming the server it connects to, and make test-store-network-policies holds the four policies to them.

The vLLM instances (llm-vllm-ingress, with gpuAcceleration true) admit the gateway alone, on port 8000; one policy selects every instance by its component label (llms.md §6).

A provider's token stays in its Secret. The models the gateway offers are its configuration file, written from the Cluster claim; for a model of an external provider the file names an environment variable, and the gateway's container sets it at start from the Secret llm-provider-credentials, which the External Secrets Operator copies from gentian-os/kernel/llm-providers. The token is in no ConfigMap, not in git and not in the gateway's database. The gateway stores no model (STORE_MODEL_IN_DB is off), so its console and its API cannot add an endpoint for tenants' prompts to be sent to; the claim is the only place that names one.

A provider reads its own token, at a public address. All providers' tokens are properties of that one path, and a provider's is <name>_api_key. The director refuses to write a provider that names another property, and the gateway's chart offers no model of one a hand-edited claim carries, so no provider's address is sent another provider's token. The director also refuses a provider address that is not a public https address, by the rules it holds a catalog's address to, and resolves a new one before committing it. That is a check of what is written: the gateway resolves the name itself at each call, and system-llm has no egress policy. Whoever may configure the cluster may still change a provider's address, and that provider's token then goes to the new one.

A provider's credential requirement comes from the claim. The Cluster composition declares llm-provider-<name> and its probe for each provider under spec.llm.providers. It is the only requirement a claim gives rise to besides a repository's, and the composition fixes everything but the provider's name: the vault path is gentian-os/kernel/llm-providers, and the one field is computed from the name. A requirement lets nobody write; the custodian writes as the person, under their own OpenBao policy (llms.md §5).

2.10 A tenant's website on the cluster's main address

On a single-tenancy cluster the user tenant may publish a public website on the cluster's bare domain (routing.md §5). It is the most visible page of the cluster and nobody is signed in on it.

Control	Detail
Only one tenant, one surface at a time: the user tenant of a single cluster, or the tenant the claim names in spec.mainAddress.tenant under either mode	The director refuses anything else (409), and the operator publishes nothing for it
Two people say so: the profile's author (apex: true on the entry) and the tenant's perimeter approver (apex: true on the request, can_expose)	—
Recorded with owner, publish date and review date, like every published surface	(the exposure registry)
The approver is shown what is approved (address, paths, whether anybody signs in) before approving, and only what an installed app declares can be approved	The director's read lists it, and refuses an approval of an app that is not installed or an entry that is not declared for the perimeter (422). The read is from git, so it says where an entry will answer, not whether it answers yet
Served from the tenant's DMZ by a proxy that passes no cookie, token or identity header in, and no Set-Cookie out	—
/branding/, /sign-in, /.well-known/acme-challenge/ and /.well-known/pki-validation/ stay the platform's	Twice: route precedence at the Gateway, and 404 in the website's proxy
https://<kernelDomain>/sign-in always leads to sign-in	—
The approver is told what a script on the website can do to sign-in, and acknowledges the rule below; who and when is recorded with the entry	The director refuses the request without it (400)

The finding. Any page served on the bare domain can set a cookie for the whole domain, and the browser then sends it to desktop., admin., platform. and id.<kernelDomain> as well. A script in such a page cannot read or forge anybody's session. It can do two things:

• stop a person from signing in, until they clear their cookies;
• plant a session of the script author's own, so that the person works in the author's account without noticing, and what they do or type there ends up with the author.

The same is true of every app host on a single-tenancy cluster; a public website makes it more likely, because websites load scripts from other parties and have more editors.

The platform's session cookies are set per host and without a Domain (routing.md §4.2). The bare domain has none, the website's server receives none, and it cannot set any through its answers: the proxy removes Cookie and Authorization from every request and Set-Cookie from every answer. What the proxy cannot stop is a script running in a page on <kernelDomain> setting a cookie for the whole domain (Domain=<kernelDomain>); the browser then sends it to desktop., admin., platform. and id.<kernelDomain> beside the real one, and the Gateway reads the first cookie of a name it finds (Envoy's OAuth2 filter).

Can the website's page...	Answer
read somebody's session, or forge one	No. The cookies are encrypted and signed with a key the page does not have, and the signature covers the host
stop a visitor from signing in	Yes. A cookie with the right name and a wrong value makes the Gateway reject the session, until the visitor clears their cookies or the planted cookie expires
sign a visitor in to an account the page's author chose	Yes. The author can plant the cookies of a session of their own. The visitor then works in that account without having chosen it; their own account is not exposed, but what they type goes to the wrong one

What would close it is the __Host- cookie name prefix: browsers refuse a Domain on such a cookie, so a planted one is never sent. It is not a configuration change in the versions in use. Envoy Gateway lets a policy name two of the OAuth2 filter's seven cookies (the access and ID token); the other five have fixed names (OauthHMAC-, OauthExpires-, RefreshToken-, OauthNonce-, CodeVerifier-), and two of those are set with a path other than /, which the prefix forbids. Keycloak's cookie names on id.<kernelDomain> are fixed in its source. An owner who does not accept the risk keeps the website off the cluster's domain, on a domain of its own, or allows on the main address only a website whose scripts the organization controls; a website can protect its visitors itself with a strict content security policy and no third-party scripts.

The rule. A website goes on the main address only if the organization itself controls every script it runs: no third-party scripts (analytics, embeds, widgets, anything loaded from another host) and no pages uploaded by users.

Why the platform cannot enforce it. The platform sees a backend and the paths it serves, not what the pages load or who may edit them, and both change after approval without anything passing the platform. So the rule is the approver's to keep. The director answers a request for the main address with the warning and publishes only once the approver sends "acknowledgeMainAddressRule": true, on the first publication and on every review. The entry then records who acknowledged and when (apexAcknowledgedBy, apexAcknowledgedAt), in the exposure registry in git.

What remains possible. The acknowledgement is a person's word, not a control. A site that breaks the rule, or one whose own scripts are replaced by an attacker, can still do both things above to anybody who visits it.

2.11 No app at an address people trust as the platform's

People recognize the platform by its addresses: the desktop at desktop.<their domain>, the administration console at admin., sign-in at id.. A profile states the label its component answers on, and a profile from a catalog is written by whoever publishes the catalog. Without a rule, an app whose profile says subDomain: desktop would claim the desktop's host; the Gateway resolves two routes on one host by age, without an error, so a tenant's people could be shown a look-alike desktop or sign-in page under the address they trust.

Control	Detail
One list of address names the platform keeps, with the reason for each (routing.md §3.1)	(internal/hostnames) a test holds the documents to it
A reserved name is admitted only for the platform's own component for it, and only for that component's own label	—
"The platform's own" is not what a profile says of itself: it is the profile's name together with no catalog having brought it. The director records the origin of everything it materializes, refuses a profile that states an origin itself, and refuses any catalog's profile under a name the platform ships	—
The director refuses an install, an add-on or an import that would take a reserved name (422), before anything is committed	—
The operator refuses again where the component would be published: held whole (HostReserved), before any policy, release, route or perimeter listener is written	—
Applies under every domain a tenant can have, a custom domain included	—
Names that only resemble a reserved one (desktop1, desk-top, my-login)	Not covered: no rule for it is well defined
An app's page imitating the platform's look under its own, permitted address	Not covered: the address is what is protected

Whoever can write to the deployments repository or apply objects to the cluster directly is not constrained by this: that is the cluster owner's authority, and a ComponentProfile written there with no origin is taken for what its name says.

The installer is such a writer, and what it writes is held to a digest. At install it places the default profiles -- the Operations Console's, from <catalog address>/profiles/operations-console.yaml, at the address GENTIAN_STORE_CATALOGUE_URL names (GENTIAN_DEFAULT_PROFILES) -- in the cluster's catalog directory (_scaffold_default_profiles; AD-14). A file is written only when it hashes to the digest the same catalog's index.yaml lists for the entry, or to a digest the person installing pinned (@sha256:<digest>), which the index does not override; a mismatch stops the install. It is written as the director writes an install, with its bundle and with the catalog as its origin, so it is a catalog's profile and not one "no catalog brought"; an entry under a name the platform ships is refused.

What that is worth, precisely. The index is served by the catalog the file comes from, over HTTPS, and is not signed: a digest from it catches a file that changed without its index, not a catalog that publishes a file and an index that agree with each other. A pin is the person's own statement and catches that too. Afterwards the operator compares the profile on the cluster, and what its bundle brings, with that bundle before it rolls out the Component it creates for a default profile, and holds the Component when they differ (internal/profilebundle/recorded.go). The digest it uses is the one recorded with the profile, the bundle's own: no second place states it, as the tenant's manifest does for an install, so a profile replaced together with its bundle is not caught. And the installer applies the part of the director's bundle check that concerns kinds, names and metadata, not the rules inside a companion's body.

---

2.12 What the sign-in sidecar trusts, and what remains weak

For an app that can do neither OIDC nor SAML, a program of the platform's stands beside it and makes the app's session for a person the realm vouches for (iam.md §1.11, app-customization.md §2.3a). It holds what its handler needs of the app, which is usually the app's signing key and database. This section is what guards it.

The one path with no session. /sso/acs of the app's host takes no session and is not shown to the bouncer: the realm posts its answer from its own address, and for a tenant on a domain of its own a browser sends the front door's SameSite=Lax cookies with no such request. The route matches that path exactly, by POST, removes the identity headers a client could send, and leads to the sidecar alone. Every other path of the app keeps its session and its question.

What the sidecar accepts there. All of this, or the request is refused and the sign-in it answered is spent:

It checks	So that
Two signatures by a certificate of the realm: the response as a whole and the assertion in it. Everything it reads is read from the signed bytes	nothing posted is believed that the realm did not say
The issuer is the realm it was told about	another realm's people are not this tenant's
Destination, the assertion's Recipient and the audience are its own address and name	an answer made for another app is not accepted here
InResponseTo names a request this process sent, not answered before, at most five minutes old	nobody presents an answer the sidecar did not ask for, or one twice
The browser carries the cookie set when that request was sent	an answer obtained in one browser is not completed in another
The person the realm names is the person the front door admitted when the request was sent	only somebody who may use the app is signed in to it, and as themselves
The validity period; exactly one assertion, in clear, not presented before; no document type declaration	a stale, repeated or doctored message is not accepted

Who may use the app is the front door's answer, not the sidecar's. /sso/login is behind the session and the bouncer, so only a person with can_use on the app begins a sign-in, and the answer has to be about that same person. A member of the realm without the right cannot begin one, and an answer they obtain elsewhere answers no request of theirs.

Who administers the app is the realm's answer, in the assertion it signs: the one role of the sidecar's client, granted to the tenant's app-admins group. The sidecar reads it from the signed assertion — the assertion's own attribute Role with the value gentian-app-admin — and from nothing a request says about itself; an answer changed after signing is refused whole. The client has no other role in scope (fullScopeAllowed is off), so a role of that name elsewhere in the realm, or at another app's client, is not listed. The handler gives the app's administrator role to that person and takes it from anybody else at every sign-in, so a withdrawal is in force within the hour a session lasts.

Which code is handed the app's keys. The handler is part of the app's bundle. It is run only from a bundle of a catalog of the whole cluster, for an install pinned to that bundle's digest; the operator gives the sidecar the bundle's bytes and their sha256, and the sidecar loads no other file. A tenant's own catalog cannot bring one, and no sidecar runs for a tenant that signs in in the kernel realm: the Component is held with SignInSidecarRefused. What it is handed is this app's own database login and the secrets of this app the profile lists, read from this app's vault paths; a profile names which, never where.

What it may reach, and what may reach it. Out: the realm's signing certificate, and what the profile declared for the handler — the app's database server, the app's own pods — one port each. It does not carry the app's label, so none of the app's other paths are its. In: the edge, and the identity provider's namespace, which tells it of a sign-out (below); no pod of the tenant.

Signing out. The sidecar's client at the realm names the sidecar's own Service as its SAML single-logout address, http://<app>-sign-in.<namespace>.svc.cluster.local:8081/sso/logout, and asks the browser for nothing: when a person signs out, the realm posts a signed LogoutRequest there itself. No route carries /sso/logout, so nothing outside the cluster reaches it, and the sidecar answers it only under that Service name — a request that arrived under the app's public name is answered 404. What it accepts there, or it ends nothing:

It checks	So that
A signature by a certificate of the realm over the request as a whole. Everything it reads is read from the signed bytes	nothing posted is believed that the realm did not say
It is a LogoutRequest, and its issuer is the realm it was told about	an answer or a request of another kind, or another realm's, signs nobody out
Destination is exactly its own sign-out address	a request made for another app's sidecar is not accepted here
Issued within the last two minutes and not in the future; not past its NotOnOrAfter where it has one; not presented before	a kept request is not presented later, or twice
It names one person, by e-mail address, in clear; a realm session this process signed somebody else in from is not named for them	the handler is told the person the realm means
Exactly one request in the post; no document type declaration	a doctored message is not accepted

It then calls the handler's onLogout for that person, where the handler has one. The worst a request could do that got past all of this is sign a person out of one app. It could not sign anybody in: the path makes no session.

Control	Detail
The checks above, each with a test; run against Keycloak 26.8.0 at the three kinds of address	(gentian-apps, images/gentian-sidecar-sso-saml)
The session-less route is one exact path, POST, to the sidecar; no policy names it and the bouncer has no line for it	A test holds it
The handler is the pinned bundle's, from a cluster catalog only	Held with SignInSidecarRefused otherwise
The handler is given only what the profile declared, of the app's own	—
The sidecar's image is one build, named by tag and digest	—
An app session lasts at most an hour and no longer than its realm session	In the sidecar; the handler has to give its token that lifetime
A sign-out at the realm ends the person's sessions in the app, on a request the realm signed and addressed to the sidecar inside the cluster	Tests in the sidecar, against Keycloak 26.8.0, and against Docmost and OpenProject.
Who administers the app is read from the signed assertion alone; given and withdrawn at sign-in	Tests in the sidecar, against Keycloak 26.8.0, and against both apps

What remains weak.

• The sidecar can become anybody in its app. That is what it is for. Whoever takes it over, or changes the handler in a catalog the cluster trusts and has an install moved to it, has every account of that app in that tenant. No other way of signing in has such a program.
• The identity headers on /sso/login are believed. They are the bouncer's and are not signed. A pod that reached the sidecar directly could begin a sign-in under a name it chose — and would then still need the realm's signed answer for that name, so it gains only the skipped check of who may use the app. The network policy is what keeps pods from reaching it.
• The realm's certificate is fetched over plain HTTP inside the cluster. Something that could answer in the identity provider's place there could sign answers of its own.
• Requests to the realm are not signed. The sidecar holds no key. Anybody can make the realm post an answer to the sidecar's address for whoever is at the browser; the sidecar refuses it, because it asked for none.
• Within the hour, the app can show the previous person — where the sign-out did not end the session. Anna signs out, Ben signs in at the same browser and opens a page of the app that is not an entry path: an app that still has Anna's session shows it. Docmost and OpenProject end it when the realm tells the sidecar. It is left in two cases: a sidecar that was not running at the moment the realm told it, because the realm tells once; and a realm session that ran out without a sign-out. Opening the app from its tile goes through the sign-in and gives Ben his own.
• The sign-out request arrives over plain HTTP inside the cluster, like the realm's certificate. It carries the person's address and the realm session's identifier and no secret: something that read it would learn who signed out, and presenting it again is refused.
• Signing out at one device signs the person out of the app at all of them. The handler is told who, not which browser. The other device is taken through the sign-in again, silently.
• App Admin is one role per tenant. Who holds it administers every app of the tenant that maps it, not one app.
• A withdrawn administrator keeps the role until their next sign-in, at most an hour, in an app that does not ask again in between.
• A person is an e-mail address to the app. An address given to somebody else later is the same account. The person's permanent identifier is not what these apps key on.
• Accounts are made and never removed. A person removed at the platform cannot get in, and their account and what they made stay in the app.
• A handler depends on the app's inside: its tables, its token, its calls. A new version of the app can break it, or worse, change what a field means. Each has an end-to-end test against the real app that is to be run before the app's version moves; nothing enforces that it is.
• The app's own protections for sign-in do not apply: its second factor, its lock after failed attempts, its record of sign-ins. The realm's do.
• Whether a vendor accepts this in place of its paid single sign-on is a judgement per app, recorded in the app's Customization record, and not made here.

2.13 Who may reach a pod of a kernel namespace

Every kernel namespace refuses an ingress that nothing lists. The list is one file, internal/kernel/kernelnet/inventory.yaml: per namespace, every pod set, every port it listens on, and for each port who is admitted, with where in the repository that was read. The NetworkPolicies are generated from it (kernel/security/network-policies/kernel-network-policies.yaml, make gen-kernel-network-policies), so no rule exists without a line that says who it is for.

They are plain networking.k8s.io/v1 NetworkPolicy and name no address block, so they mean the same on every network plugin that enforces NetworkPolicy. Each namespace has one policy, kernel-ingress, that selects every pod; rules are by the pod's port, because a plugin matches a connection after a Service's port has become the pod's.

Namespace	Admitted from outside the namespace	Pods of the namespace reach each other
kernel-gitops	Nothing by these rules. Argo CD's own manifest ships a policy per component, and those stand: the console (8080) stays open to any source, as upstream has it	No: a rule for the whole namespace would widen upstream's
kernel-provisioning	9443 from any source (Crossplane's and its providers' webhooks, called by the API server)	Yes
kernel-secrets	The vault, 8200: the operator, the custodian and the director by label, and the provisioning namespace (provider-vault). 10250 from any source (External Secrets' webhook)	Yes (External Secrets reads the vault)
kernel-seal	The seal, 8200: the secrets namespace	Yes
kernel-data	9443 from any source (CloudNativePG's webhook). The kernel's PostgreSQL keeps its own policy (§2.8)	Yes
kernel-authentication	Keycloak, 8080: the edge namespace, the control namespace's programs, the provisioning namespace, tenant namespaces, the mail namespaces. Its management port (9000) and 8443: nobody	Yes (the realm Jobs)
kernel-authorization	OpenFGA, 8080: the control namespace's programs and the bouncer, by label. gRPC, metrics, playground: nobody	Yes
kernel-control	Director and usher (8080), custodian (9444), registrar (9445): tenant namespaces. The operator keeps its own policy: its listener admits the director and the usher	No: it would open the operator's listener to every pod here
kernel-edge	The Envoy proxies: any source, any port (they are the public listeners). The bouncer, 9001: the Envoy proxies alone; 8082 (the rights check): tenant namespaces. Envoy Gateway's configuration port, 18000: the Envoy proxies. 10250 from any source (cert-manager's webhook). An HTTP-01 solver, 8089: the Envoy proxies	No: it would open the bouncer to cert-manager and external-dns
kernel-admission	9443 from any source (Kyverno's webhooks)	Yes
kernel-observability	Headlamp, 4466: the Envoy proxies. kube-oidc-proxy: nobody	Yes (Headlamp reaches kube-oidc-proxy)

What follows from this: OpenFGA is reachable from the programs that ask it and from nothing else; the bouncer's authorization port takes the Gateway's Envoy pods alone; the vault and its seal take their named clients; a tenant's pod reaches the director, the usher, the custodian and the registrar, which check the person's token, and no other port of the control namespace.

The tenant side is narrowed with it. A tenant's tenant-isolation policy admits the whole edge namespace; with the switch on it admits that namespace's Envoy pods (app.kubernetes.io/name=envoy, the label Envoy Gateway puts on every proxy pod). cert-manager, external-dns and the bouncer share the namespace and then have no path to an app on which to send identity headers. The authentication and control namespaces are still admitted whole: Keycloak's pods are an upstream chart's, and besides the operator the registrar calls a tenant's desktop.

What a NetworkPolicy cannot say, and what stands in its place.

• The API server. It is no pod, and not always on the pod's node; on a managed cluster it arrives through an agent. No portable rule names it, so every port it calls -- the admission and conversion webhooks of Crossplane and its providers, External Secrets, cert-manager, CloudNativePG, Kyverno and the operator -- admits any source. A webhook serves TLS and decides nothing by who connects; an open webhook port is what keeps an install alive on every cluster.
• The kubelet. A connection from the node a pod runs on is admitted whatever the policies say; that is NetworkPolicy's own rule, so probes need no rule and health ports are closed to everything else.
• The install host. The installer reaches the vault, the seal and Keycloak from the host, by the Service's address where the host routes to it and by kubectl port-forward where it does not (scripts/lib/portforward.sh); a port-forward enters the pod itself. Its one check through the API server's proxy, of the custodian, falls back to a port-forward as well (E-03).

Egress is not restricted in any kernel namespace. Argo CD, Crossplane and its providers, cert-manager, external-dns, Keycloak, the Envoy proxies and the operator reach the internet or the API server in ways that differ per cluster; CloudNativePG's instances call the API server; OpenFGA's database address is the claim's to decide. A pod of a kernel namespace is stopped at another kernel namespace's door by that namespace's rules, and on the way out by nothing.

Not covered. system-mail and system-mail-dmz are system namespaces and their rules are written with the mail servers (§2.8); nothing here selects a pod of them. kube-system and the load balancer's namespace are the cluster's own. The system and shared tiers are as §2.7 to §2.9 leave them.

The switch. KERNEL_NETWORK_POLICIES, read by the installer and on by default, after a check that the CNI enforces NetworkPolicy. true applies the file with the namespaces themselves, in the installer's first step -- before a pod exists in any of them on a fresh cluster, and with nothing else running to deliver it; anything else removes every policy labeled gentianos.io/kernel-network-policy and applies none. The operator is told the same switch, and its two rules that rest on the same fact -- the tenant side above, and the publishing proxy's own ingress rule (§2.14) -- follow it. A cluster whose CNI does not enforce NetworkPolicy stops at that check. A caller the inventory lacks shows as a timeout in the middle of an install (reference/install.md §9).

How it is held. go test ./internal/kernel/kernelnet/ reads the generated policies with NetworkPolicy's own semantics and asserts that every caller the inventory names is admitted, that a list of flows a cluster cannot do without is admitted by the pods' real labels, and that a list of flows the rules exist to refuse is refused (a tenant's pod to OpenFGA, the vault, the seal, the bouncer's authorization port, the operator's listener; a publishing proxy to anything in the kernel; cert-manager to the bouncer). It also fails when a Go file or a template of the operator's chart gains an in-cluster address nobody classified. make test-kernel-network-policies renders the operator's chart and the bootstrap chart and fails on a port, a Service or a webhook in a kernel namespace that the inventory does not have, and on a pinned chart whose version is not the one the inventory was read at. What they prove is that the list and the rules agree, and that the list agrees with what the repository deploys.

2.14 What a published entry is held to, and the limits at the edge

Who may approve one. Approving and withdrawing a perimeter entry is asked as can_expose on the tenant, never as admin (AD-6; authz/model/v1/model.fga). The same relation answers the tenant's egress beyond the baseline (can_approve_privilege: can_expose): the perimeter is one decision in both directions. It is held by:

Who	How	Withdrawn by
A perimeter approver of the tenant	An administrator of the tenant the cluster's administrator names on the Cluster claim (spec.platformAccess.roleHolders, role perimeterApprover, scope tenant:<t>, with a reason and an optional expiresAt); the operator writes user:<realm>/<sub> perimeter_approver tenant:<t> (iam.md §1.1c)	Removing the entry, or its expiresAt passing
The cluster's perimeter approver	A person of the platform tenant named the same way, scope cluster: cluster#perimeter_approver, which every tenant's perimeter_approver derives from	The same
The cluster's administrator	The model: admin from cluster, in every tenant by default, a tenant that administers itself too: the perimeter is the cluster's. No tuple of its own, no kernel-realm person in a tenant-realm group, and nothing else in the tenant by it	Leaving gentian:platform:admin

A tenant's own administrators approve nothing at the perimeter by being administrators. Naming one is the cluster's administrator's alone (can_configure); the director refuses a person of a tenant who is not in its admins group as the store holds it. Nothing a tenant's administrator manages decides who approves: the role is on the Cluster claim, not in a group of the tenant's realm.

A perimeter entry is answered by a publishing proxy in the tenant's DMZ (AD-6). The proxy checks nobody, and holds every request to the following, whatever the profile says (internal/controller/component_perimeter_config.go):

Methods	TRACE, TRACK and CONNECT are refused (405)
The path	Refused (400) when it has more than one reading: an empty segment (//), a dot segment plain or encoded (/../, /%2e%2e/), an encoded slash, backslash or NUL, a backslash, a path parameter (;). The proxy decides on the normalized path and sends the app the path as written, so only a path both read alike is let through
Declared prefixes	By whole segments: /s publishes /s and /s/x, not /sx. Anything else is 404 from the proxy
Denied paths	Compared without regard to case
A declared path	One with a character outside letters, digits and / . _ ~ - is not rendered. If a denied path cannot be rendered the entry publishes nothing
Body	10 MB (413)
Headers	8 kB for the request line and for each header, 32 kB together (400/414); a header name with an underscore is dropped
Timeouts	15 s to send the headers, 30 s between two reads of a body, 5 s to connect to the app, 60 s for the app to answer
Rate	20 requests a second for each client address, with 200 more at once; then 429. On an entry that passes the caller's credential to the app: 5 a second, with 50 more at once
Concurrency	100 requests at a time for each client address; then 429. On an entry that passes the credential: 20
Identity	Every header the front door sets (internal/bouncer, IdentityHeaders: x-gentian-subject, -realm, -session, -email, -name, -id-token) is removed, with Cookie, X-Forwarded-Access-Token and the older X-Auth-Request-* names. Authorization is removed too, except on an entry declared authMode: app and approved as that, where it is passed on as the caller sent it. A test holds the proxy's list to the bouncer's, so a header added there is removed here
The connection	X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP are set to the one client address, X-Forwarded-Proto to https, X-Forwarded-Host to the host; Forwarded, X-Forwarded-Port, -Prefix, -Server, X-Original-URL and X-Rewrite-URL are removed
Answers	Set-Cookie and X-Powered-By are removed; Server names the proxy, without a version

With the kernel's network rules on (§2.13) the proxy's pods admit the Gateway's Envoy pods and nothing else (<name>-ingress in the DMZ namespace), which is what makes the forwarded address the Gateway's word. With them off any pod of the cluster that can reach the proxy can state an address of its choosing: it is then counted, and shown to the app, under that one.

Whose address. The address the Gateway saw the connection come from, which Envoy appends to X-Forwarded-For -- unless the cluster is reached through the tunnel, where every connection comes from the tunnel's client and the address is read from CF-Connecting-IP, which Cloudflare sets and overwrites. Which of the two holds is asked of the cluster and not assumed (edgeClientAddressHeader): what the operator was told (NETWORK_MODE, EDGE_INGRESS), else the Gateway's own Service -- without an address outside the cluster (ClusterIP) nothing but the tunnel's client and the cluster's pods can reach the Gateway, so the header is the tunnel's word; with one, a caller could write it and it is not read. A load balancer or CDN that replaces the caller's address with its own makes every caller one address, and the limit then counts them together until the administrator names the header that carries the caller's (PERIMETER_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER).

Sign-in. Two routes without a session take a credential, and each carries Envoy's local rate limit (BackendTrafficPolicy.rateLimit.local, internal/controller/edge_rate_limit.go): 60 POSTs a minute for each client address to a realm's sign-in pages (/auth/realms/<realm>/login-actions/), and the same to a sign-in sidecar's /sso/acs. Local means a bucket in each Envoy pod, so with two proxies an address may get twice that; it bounds how fast one address can post, and Keycloak's brute-force detection per account is what stops slow guessing. Pages, their assets and the token endpoint are not limited: the Gateway's own code exchange and apps' calls arrive at the token endpoint from a few addresses that stand for everybody.

The numbers are the platform's, and the cluster's administrator may change them through the operator's environment: PERIMETER_MAX_BODY, PERIMETER_RATE_PER_SECOND, PERIMETER_RATE_BURST, PERIMETER_CONCURRENT_PER_CLIENT, the three for an entry that passes the credential (PERIMETER_CREDENTIAL_RATE_PER_SECOND, PERIMETER_CREDENTIAL_RATE_BURST, PERIMETER_CREDENTIAL_CONCURRENT_PER_CLIENT, each held to the general one where it is set higher), PERIMETER_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER (a header name, or none), EDGE_SIGN_IN_POSTS_PER_MINUTE (0 turns that limit off). A profile cannot change any of them.

What an entry's authMode means. Two values are served on a perimeter entry, and neither is a check the platform makes of the caller.

• none: the declared paths, for anyone. Authorization and Cookie are removed, so no credential reaches the app. What still reaches it is the path, the query, the body and the other headers, so a link that carries its own secret, or a signature in a header of its own, can be checked by the app.
• app: the same, and the caller's Authorization header is passed to the app as sent. The callers are sync clients, mobile apps, API clients and webhooks that hold a credential the app itself issued; only the app can check it. The proxy does not look at it. It takes effect only when the tenant's perimeter approver approved the entry as that kind (publicAppCredential in the registry): an entry approved as a plain public address whose catalog entry later declares app is taken down until it is approved again.

What app costs is said to the approver in the director's words before they approve, and is accepted (AD-1): the platform does not know or check who calls; an app password or token of a person who was removed from the tenant keeps working until the app itself revokes it; every request may be a guess at a password that lands on the app's own sign-in, which is why the rate is lower and why the app's own lock-out matters. Cookies pass in neither direction, so a client that needs the app's cookie on a public address does not work.

jwt, bearer, basic and signature are refused on a perimeter entry by the schema.

The same approver decides one thing that is not a public address. An entry behind sign-in may declare clientAuthorization: app: the Authorization header is the app's own. Approved (signInAppAuthorization in the registry), the Gateway leaves the header as the browser sent it and the bouncer does not remove it. The session and the bouncer's question are required as on every entry — the OAuth2 filter admits no request on a bearer, and the bouncer is shown the session as an ID token in a header of its own (routing.md §4.1) — and no platform token reaches the app. What changes for the app is that it now receives a header a signed-in person's browser chose, where before it received none; it must check it as it would on its own.

How it is held. The proxy's rules are asked of the proxy: TestTheProxyItself* (internal/controller/component_perimeter_nginx_test.go) start the image the operator deploys with the configuration it renders, in front of a server that says back what it was sent, and send it some ninety paths written to leave a prefix or reach a denied path, every identity header in three spellings, oversized bodies and headers, and bursts from two addresses; and, for an entry that passes the credential, that Authorization arrives as sent on the declared paths and on no other, that Cookie and every identity header still do not, and that guesses from one address are answered 429 at the lower limit. They need docker and are skipped without it. The sign-in limits are validated against the pinned release's definitions, and TestEnvoyGatewayAcceptsTheRateLimits puts them through that release's own translator where its egctl is installed.

2.15 Telling an app that a person signed out

When a person signs out, the realm ends its session and the front door stops admitting that browser within five minutes (routing.md §4.2). What that leaves is each app's own session: on a shared browser the next person, admitted as themselves, could be shown the previous person's account. So the realm tells the app, and the app ends its session (iam.md §1.12). For an app with its own OIDC client that is an OpenID Connect logout token, posted to an address the platform registers with the client. This section is what that address may be, who can reach it, and what is left. The sign-in sidecar's side is §2.12.

A profile states a path and which of its own entries serves it (requires.services.identity.oidc.backchannelLogout); a whole address (backchannelLogoutUrl) is refused. The operator builds http://<backend.service>.<namespace>.svc.cluster.local:<backend.port><path> and registers it.

(a) What the app must verify, and what happens if it does not. A logout token is a JWT the realm signs. Before it ends a session the app has to check the signature against the realm's published keys, the issuer, that the audience is its own client, and that the token carries the back-channel logout event; it then ends the session the token's sid names, or the sessions of its sub. The platform cannot check that an app does. An app that ends a session on a token it did not verify lets whoever can reach that path sign a person out of it — an annoyance, and never a sign-in: the path makes no session. So the declaration is a review item: the profile's customization record says what the app checks, and the app is run once against Keycloak with a token signed by another key and an unsigned one. For the two that declare it and were run: Nextcloud's user_oidc checks signature, audience, event, the absence of a nonce, and that it holds a session for the token's sid, sub and issuer together; XWiki's OIDC authenticator checks signature, issuer and audience against the keys the realm publishes, provided a provider is configured, which the profile does. (Open WebUI checks the token as well, and cannot end the session without Redis, so its declaration has no effect.)

(b) Who can reach the path. Nothing new. The address is the app's Service inside the cluster, and what reaches an app's pods is what the tenant's network policies already admit (internal/kernel/netpolicy):

• the identity provider's namespace — Keycloak, and the realm, client and group Jobs that run beside it — on every port, which is the path the notice takes;
• the edge: the Gateway's Envoy pods, and with KERNEL_NETWORK_POLICIES off every pod of the edge namespace;
• the control namespace: the operator and the programs beside it;
• pods of the same app; another app of the tenant that holds a granted contract with it; the app's sign-in sidecar, on the one port its profile declares;
• the node the pod runs on.

No other app of the tenant, no other tenant, and nothing outside the cluster. The same path at the app's public address is behind the session and the bouncer, so a signed-in person who may use the app can post to it. That is why (a) matters for an app that verifies nothing.

(c) The realm cannot be pointed at another address. The address is built, never written. Each part is held to what it has to be, by the definition's rules and again by the Composition, which registers nothing if one fails:

Part	From	Held to
The Service	the backend.service of the entry the profile names	an entry of this profile, with no backend.component — this component's own Service — and a plain name: one DNS label, so nothing in it can end the host or begin a path
The namespace	the install's, from the claim the operator writes	not the profile's to say
The port	that entry's backend.port	a port number
The path	the profile	segments of letters, digits, _, ~, -, with single dots inside: no query, no fragment, no .., no //, no @
Scheme, .svc.cluster.local	fixed	—

So the realm is told to call a Service of that name in the component's own namespace and nothing else: not another namespace, not a host outside the cluster. For the sign-in sidecar the Service is the operator's own (<app>-sign-in) and the claim carries only the port.

What this does not close. The Service is the app's chart's to define. A chart that gave the Service of that name hand-written endpoints instead of its own pods could make the realm post to an address of the chart's choosing after all. What such a request can carry is fixed: a POST, a plain path, and a body the chart does not choose (a logout token for its own client, which no other client accepts). What admits the identity provider's namespace is every tenant's pods, Keycloak's own database and the mail relay, and the operator's membership listener. This is the position a chart already has towards the Gateway, which routes to the same Service; it needs a chart written to do it. The platform does not check a Service's endpoints.

(d) Plain HTTP inside the cluster. The token is signed and is not a credential: it names the issuer, the client, the person's identifier and the realm session, and it is good for ending that session and nothing else. Something that could read the hop would learn who signed out of what; something that could change it could only make it invalid. It is the same hop, and the same absence of TLS, as an app's connection to its database.

(e) The name the app is called by. The app sees its Service's name in the Host header, not its public one. An app that refuses a host it does not know needs that name among the hosts it trusts. Trusting it lets the app answer a caller under that name; it does not make the app reachable from anywhere it was not, because reaching it is the network policy's question and the name is only what an admitted caller writes in a header. The risk a host list guards against — a link in a mail built from a Host header an attacker chose — needs the attacker to reach the app under that name, which no browser can. For Nextcloud as the catalog configures it no name had to be added at all: with overwritehost set it does not hold a request to its list of trusted names, and XWiki answered under its Service's name as it is.

(f) The identity provider's own egress. The kernel's network rules restrict who may connect to a kernel pod, not where one connects to: kernel-authentication is egress: open in the inventory the rules are generated from (internal/kernel/kernelnet/inventory.yaml), which names this flow among the reasons.

What the notice does not do. Keycloak 26.8.0 posts it once, when a person signs out or an administrator ends their session. It does not post again if the app was not there, and posts nothing when a session only runs out. So it ends an app session at once in the ordinary case and bounds nothing: an app's own session lifetime is still the bound, and for an app that cannot be told it is the only thing there is.

Control	Detail
The address the realm posts to is built from the profile's own entry, in the install's namespace; a profile names none	(internal/apprender) render fixtures for an accepted declaration and two refused ones (internal/apprender/testdata)
The free-form address is refused, with a message naming the field that replaces it	(the definition's rules; a test holds each)
The catalog's own profiles are admitted by those rules	A test reads the published bundles
The notice arrives at the Service's address and ends the session; a token of another key, an unsigned one and a repeated one end nothing	Shown for Nextcloud (nextcloud-base-ce) and XWiki against their images and Keycloak 26.8.0 (gentian-apps, e2e/oidc-sign-out)
An app checks the token before it ends a session	The app's, reviewed per profile and recorded in its customization record; nothing enforces it
A Service's endpoints are the app's own pods	Not checked
The notice is sent again when it did not arrive, or when a session runs out	Keycloak does neither

2.16 Who may open a mailbox with a sign-in token

Only on a cluster whose mail.serviceMode is system, and only for a tenant with mailboxes on it (spec.mail.mode selfhosted, the default there) in a realm of its own. A mail program presents either an app password or a person's access token (XOAUTH2). For a token, four things have to hold, and each is checked by a different party:

Check	By	What makes it true
The token names gentian-dovecot in its audience	Keycloak, when Dovecot introspects as gentian-dovecot	the realm's client scope mailbox, whose mapper adds that audience to an access token
The token carries the scope mailbox	Dovecot (scope = mailbox)	the client asked for mailbox at that sign-in, and has the scope
The client has the scope	Keycloak, at sign-in (invalid_scope otherwise)	the app's profile declares requires.services.mail.imap.tokenSignIn; the scope is an optional scope of that app's own client and of no other
The mailbox is the person's	Dovecot	the user is the token's email claim, and the address the mail program gave has to equal it

So an app that declares it can open the mailbox of a person who signed in to it, with the token of the sign-in at which it asked for mailbox, for as long as that token is valid. It cannot open anybody else's, and its other tokens -- the ones it holds for its own session or relays to what it calls -- open none. An app that does not declare it cannot obtain such a token at all, and a token of another realm is introspected by a realm that does not know it.

• The declaration is a grant, so it is explicit. mail.imap: {} alone means the app reads mail and is given the server's address; it does not make its tokens mailbox keys.
• Withdrawn with the declaration. A profile that stops declaring it keeps its optional scopes without mailbox; tokens already issued stay valid until they expire.
• A token with the scope is a mailbox key wherever it travels. An app should ask for mailbox in a sign-in of its own for mail and not relay that token.
• gentian-dovecot checks the audience like every other client. The client attribute that exempts one client from the check is set nowhere (TestNothingSwitchesTheIntrospectionAudienceCheckOff).
• Not served: the kernel realm, and so the platform tenant, has no mailbox scope; a cluster that relays its mail has no Dovecot. The declaration is accepted there and grants nothing.
• The network is not the gate. A profile that declares requires.services.mail is opened system-mail (kernel-access-<app>), and Dovecot's IMAP ports admit every tenant's pods, and the proxy for everybody else (§2.8); the token is the check.

2.17 A catalog kept as an OCI artifact

A catalog at an https address is public, and no credential is sent to one. A catalog whose profiles must not be public is an OCI artifact on a registry that asks for a credential, read with the credential of a repository its owner declared (custom-catalogs.md §4.4). A catalog is never kept in the deployments repository, which holds the cluster's state only: the schema has no field for one. The director reads that credential from the vault, which it does for nothing else. Addresses stay public: what is private arrives through the credential, never through a private network address.

Control	Detail
A tenant's catalog is read with a repository declared for that tenant, a catalog of the whole cluster with one declared for the cluster; the owner is where the catalog is declared, never what it says. Any other name is refused as a repository nobody declared, when it is added and on every pull	(gitops.RegistryRepository, catalogue.VaultRegistries)
The credential is read at the one path the owner's repository credentials are kept at (gentian-os/tenants/<t>/repositories/<name>, gentian-os/kernel/repositories/<name>); a declaration naming another path is refused before the vault is asked	—
The director's role at the vault, gentian-os-director, bound to its ServiceAccount and to a token of the vault's audience, holds director-repository-read: read on those two paths, and no metadata, no write, no other path	(cluster-default.yaml) held by make test-policy-openbao. The policy cannot tell one tenant from another: that the director uses a tenant's credential for that tenant's catalog only is the code above
The credential is sent only for an artifact inside the repository's address, to that registry, and to a token realm of the registry's registrable domain; a single-token credential is never traded at a realm	(catalogue/oci.go)
The registry is held to the address rules (custom-catalogs.md §7): https on 443, public host, checked in the dialer, no proxy. A manifest is not redirected; a layer's redirect is followed to a public https host only, without the credential, at most three hops	The layer's redirect is the one exception to "no redirects": a registry such as ghcr.io serves no blob without it, and the bytes are held to the layer's digest
Manifest and layer are held to their digests; the manifest is a catalog's (type, one layer); the tar is plain relative files (no .., absolute path, link or device), at most 10 MiB packed, 32 MiB unpacked, 4096 entries, 1 MiB a file	—
Who may add one is who may add an address, delegation included; whether the credential is set is not asked when it is added	—
A taken-over director reads every repository credential of the cluster, every tenant's included	Accepted (AD-14). The director holds one vault role, gentian-os-director, bound to its ServiceAccount through a token for the vault's audience; its policy reads tenants/+/repositories/+ and kernel/repositories/+ and nothing else, so what the role bounds it to is repository credentials, and no other secret of the cluster

What it does not change: whoever can push to the artifact's registry repository can put any profile into the catalog. The catalog is no stronger than that repository, and its index is not signed. Whoever may view a tenant (can_view) can read the name, version, edition and digest of every entry of a catalog that tenant sees, as for a catalog at an address; a profile itself reaches the cluster when somebody who may install apps installs it, and is then one object for the whole cluster like every profile. A catalog declared for the whole cluster is therefore listed to every tenant; one that only a tenant should see is declared for that tenant.

2.18 The layers a request passes

Each layer answers one question and is enforced by one component; a lower layer never re-answers a higher one. The rules each rests on are in the sections above; the network side is networking.md §1.

#	Layer	Question	Enforced by
L0	TLS, rate limit	well-formed and within budget?	the Envoy listener; a local limit per client address on sign-in posts (§2.14); the publishing proxy's limits per client address on a published entry
L1	Edge session	who is this, in which realm?	SecurityPolicy.oidc, one confidential client per tenant zone, the kernel realm for the platform tenant's zone and the kernel consoles (routing.md §4.1)
L1′	Perimeter	which paths, how much, does a credential pass?	the publishing proxy in the tenant's DMZ: declared paths only, one reading of a path, identity headers and cookies removed, Authorization removed unless approved as authMode: app (§2.14). It verifies no caller
L2	Reachability	may this person reach this component at all?	the bouncer, asking OpenFGA the route's relation over the stored membership projection; cached per (sub, sid, route), evicted on the change log
L3	App session and authorization	what may they do inside?	the app, from the identity headers or its own session with its own client and audience; sessionMaxAge caps how long the realm renews that client's sign-in, not the app's own cookie
L5	Network	may these two pods talk at all?	NetworkPolicy from requires, integrations and granted privileges (§2.6–§2.9, §2.13); Kyverno for what a pod may be

The edge decides reachability and the app decides everything finer, so the rights store is asked per login and app, not per request. A perimeter route skips L1–L2 by declaration: its authMode is the whole of its authentication.

2.19 The session at the edge

The edge is the only session authority (AD-13). One confidential client per tenant zone, established by the code flow against id.<kernelDomain> and silent whenever the realm's session exists; no platform component downstream runs a code flow of its own. The desktop and the consoles hold no OIDC client secret: a second confidential client in the same realm would be a second session with its own lifetime and its own sign-out, and in tenant-platform it would put a kernel-realm client secret inside a tenant namespace. The one platform component below the edge that holds a client secret is the bouncer, for each realm's gentian-edge-exchange client, with which it trades the session's token for one valid at a single app on a route that says exchangeToken (networking.md §1.1).

The edge token is not handed to every backend. It carries the director in its audience, so an app that received it could call the director, or a sibling, as the person. The Gateway forwards it only on a route whose entry sets forwardToken -- the desktop and the administration console, which relay to the director -- and gives every other backend identity headers it sets after removing inbound ones. An app that needs a session of its own runs a silent sign-in with its own client and audience, exactly as it would on a direct link.

L2 caches its decision per (sub, sid, route): the session, not the token. Keying on jti would make every refresh a cache miss, so load would scale with refreshes rather than sign-ins, and no entry could be evicted for a session nothing can name. Eviction, not expiry, is what makes a change visible: the bouncer polls OpenFGA's ReadChanges log on an interval and evicts by subject, so a withdrawn right is refused within about two seconds (routing.md §4.2); OpenFGA has no push stream, so that interval is the stated bound. If OpenFGA cannot be reached, decisions already cached stay valid until they expire and nothing not previously allowed gets through.

A session ends at the realm, and the edge follows within one access-token lifetime. The edge holds a five-minute access token and renews it against the realm session; a refresh against an ended session fails, and so does the next request on every host of the zone. There is no back-channel revocation at the edge, and no list of ended sessions, because the edge holds no session state of its own: the session is encrypted cookies in the browser and a refresh at the realm, and the bouncer runs as several replicas that keep no state between them. The bound on how long a signed-out person is still let through is the access token's lifetime, which the realm sets; that lifetime is the control. The realm tells an app of a sign-out inside the cluster where the app can be told (§2.15), and the bound on what a person may do inside an app is the app's own session. A profile's sessionMaxAge caps that sign-in at the realm: past that age the realm refuses the refresh of the app's clients, so the app cannot renew its tokens without a new sign-in. It does not end a session the app keeps in its own cookie; for an app that does not go back to the realm once a person is signed in, the app's own session setting is the bound.

Platform rights follow the store; app rights follow the token. Membership reaches OpenFGA from the realm's signed events through the operator (§3.0), and the bouncer evicts on the next poll, so a withdrawn platform right is gone without any token being touched. Apps read groups from their own tokens, so a changed membership reaches an app at that person's next sign-in to it. A profile declares sessionMaxAge so that the realm forces that sign-in at an age somebody chose, for an app that renews its tokens at the realm; an app that keeps its own cookie session without doing so is bounded by its own session setting alone.

WebSockets are authorized at upgrade; the connection carries no duration limit (§3.0).

2.20 An app without single sign-on: the options

Some apps in the catalog have no OIDC and no SAML in the installed edition. The front door does not depend on the app: nobody reaches it without a session at the realm and the right to use it, so such an app is as well guarded from outside as one with single sign-on. What does not come for free is the second half: the app has its own accounts and its own sign-in form, and does not know that the person was just checked. Three ways exist to deal with that, and the platform offers two.

Option	What happens	Where the password is	What it costs
The front door, then the app's own sign-in	The person is admitted and the app shows its own form. Accounts are created by the platform at grant time where the app has an interface for it (provisioning.syncJob), else by hand	With the person, as a hash in the app; the platform never knows it	A second password to manage, and an account that stays in the app when the person leaves unless the platform removes it. Two independent locks: a stolen app password is useless without a session at the front door
The sign-in sidecar (requires.services.identity.sidecar)	A program of the platform's beside the app acts as a SAML party towards the realm and makes the app's session for the person the realm vouches for, by the app's own means (§2.12, iam.md §1.11)	Nobody has one: the app's form is of no use	The sidecar can become anybody in its app; the app's own protections for sign-in do not apply; a handler depends on the app's inside. Whether a vendor accepts it in place of its paid single sign-on is a judgment per app, recorded in the app's Customization
A stored password per person, typed by the platform	Not offered. The custodian writes secrets into the vault and never reads one back, on purpose; nothing is allowed to read a person's app password on every open	--	A password is replayed: whoever reads it once can use it until it is changed, where a token is valid for one app and for minutes. The store of every person's passwords for an app is a target that does not exist otherwise. The password works without the platform, and sign-out and removal do not touch it

The order is the order of preference: OIDC in the installed edition first, then the front door with accounts the platform creates, then the sidecar per app after a review. Never a shared account: every session in an app belongs to one person.

An app that trusts the front door's headers ("trusted header", "remote user" authentication) is the simplest of all: no trip to the realm for the app, no client, no secret. The whole protection is the network rule, because an app in this mode believes whoever sends the header. What keeps others out: the tenant's namespace is closed by default and admits an app's pods to the Gateway's Envoy pods, the identity provider's namespace and the operator's (networking.md §2); programs of one app reach each other; another app of the tenant reaches it only where an integration between the two was granted, and can then send any header it likes; the bouncer overwrites the identity headers on every request it admits, so a browser cannot send its own; a published entry does not pass the bouncer, and its proxy removes the identity headers (§2.14). The header carries the e-mail address, and an app that keys accounts on it hands an old account to whoever is given that address later; x-gentian-subject does not have that problem, and few apps accept it. There is no session of the app to end if it reads the header on every request; an app that reads it once and then keeps a cookie of its own is like any other for sign-out (§2.15).

Standards that help with accounts, not with sign-in: SCIM creates and removes users in an app, and nothing in this repository sends it (iam.md §1.8); LDAP would need a directory server the platform does not run, and would have people type their password into the app. An app's own user interface with a service token, called by a job in the profile when a person is granted the app, is what makes the first option workable.

2.21 What a break-in at an app can and cannot reach

Somebody who takes over an app, meaning they run their own code as the app:

Can	Cannot
Read and change everything in that app	Reach another app of the tenant, unless an integration between the two was granted
See the name, e-mail address and identifier of everybody who uses it	Obtain anybody's password: it is typed at the realm only
Use the app's client secret to complete sign-ins for this app	Sign in to any other app or to the platform with that secret
Keep people's sessions in this app alive	Obtain a person's token for the platform's services, or the front door's cookies: the bouncer removes them, and the app gets the identity headers (§2.19)
Show false content to its users	Be shown inside any page but its own tenant's desktop, or frame other apps (routing.md §4.3)
	Reach another tenant, the vault, the rights store or the identity provider's administration (§2.13)

One qualification: the app's pages run in the person's browser under the tenant's domain, beside the desktop. A hostile page can try to mislead the person. It cannot read the desktop's or another app's pages or cookies: browsers keep addresses apart, and the front door's cookies are valid for one host each.

---

3. Architecture

3.0 Controls in place

Read from internal/, crossplane/, kernel/ and the administration console's backend (gentian-ui, apps/admin-console). A row changes only when the code does.

Control	Where
Keycloak per-tenant realms, kernel realm, OIDC for the desktops, the consoles and apps	kernel/services/keycloak-idp installs Keycloak (Argo CD, the keycloakx chart vendored); realms and clients come from tenant-default.yaml and identity_reconciler.go
Keycloak group → OpenFGA tuple sync	Membership is stored as group#member tuples, a projection the operator writes from Keycloak's signed event-listener statements (membership_listener.go, internal/membership). The operator is the writer AD-12 names; the director writes nothing to the store. Nothing reconciles the stored memberships toward Keycloak, and a change of a person's groups ends none of their sessions
Keycloak's administrator credential (gentian-operator)	The operator reads the keycloak-admin Secret and hands it to the Jobs that configure realms, clients and groups (identity_reconciler.go, internal/keycloak/shell_helpers.go). The process that writes the rights store is therefore also the one that can change any identity.
Gateway ext-auth calling OpenFGA Check on every session route	internal/bouncer, attached by internal/controller/bouncer.go; the session filter runs first and the bouncer refuses a request without a token it verified (routing.md §4.1). Fails closed
Session cookies: per host, encrypted, SameSite=Lax; frame policy naming the tenant's own desktop	zoneSecurityPolicySpec, componentFramers (routing.md §4.2, §4.3)
Sign-out reaching the apps	Sign-out ends the realm session and the edge's cookies. The realm then tells an app inside the cluster: an app with its own OIDC client at the path its profile declares (backchannelLogout), at an address the platform builds from the entry's own Service (internal/apprender); an app behind the sign-in sidecar through the sidecar's /sso/logout (signin_sidecar.go). Shown end to end for Nextcloud (nextcloud-base-ce), XWiki, Docmost and OpenProject. Not told, or told to no effect: Open WebUI, Element, Mathesar, Odoo, and nextcloud-base-od — their sessions last as long as the app keeps them, though the front door refuses the person's next request. The realm tells once and not when a session only runs out (§2.15, iam.md §1.12)
Identity headers to a backend	x-gentian-* are plain headers. What makes them the bouncer's word is that only the Gateway's Envoy pods reach the backend: a NetworkPolicy, and for the kernel side one that is on by default (§2.13). The same holds for a sign-in sidecar's /sso/login (§2.12)
An app's own bearer token through the front door	An entry that declares clientAuthorization: app keeps the header once the tenant's perimeter approver approved it; the session and the bouncer's check stay required and no platform token reaches the app (approvedClientAuthorization, internal/bouncer; routing.md §4.1). Every other session route drops it, but for two kernel consoles that keep theirs by the kernel's own rule: Keycloak's administration console, and the model gateway's where the claim switches it on (§2.9). A client with no browser session cannot use a session route at all: it needs a public entry of authMode: app
The session's tokens stop at the edge: a backend gets its own cookies, the identity headers, and a bearer only where its exposure says forwardToken	internal/bouncer/cookies.go rewrites the Cookie header without the edge's cookies on every allowed request of a session route; the names come from the route table (routing.md §4.1)
Tenant namespace + NetworkPolicy default-deny egress	internal/kernel/netpolicy/ — tenant namespaces only
Per-app egress to the stores a profile declares	internal/kernel/netpolicy/kernel.go, policy kernel-access-<app>; see §2.6
NetworkPolicy in the kernel namespaces	Each of the eleven kernel namespaces refuses an ingress nothing lists, from one inventory (internal/kernel/kernelnet/inventory.yaml) the policies are generated from; webhook ports admit any source, because no portable rule names the API server (§2.13). Applied by the installer with the namespaces. Without the switch a kernel pod is selected only by the policies its own chart delivers. No kernel namespace restricts egress
NetworkPolicy in system and shared namespaces	One on each shared store -- PostgreSQL, MariaDB, Redis, SeaweedFS -- admitting tenant namespaces and the platform's named clients (§2.7). One each on Dovecot and Postfix, which do not face the internet, and one on the proxy in the mail DMZ that does -- the one pod of these whose egress is restricted too (§2.8). One on each server of the model gateway's namespace (§2.9). The kernel's own PostgreSQL and the operator keep the policies their charts deliver, beside the kernel namespaces' rules
Publishing proxy: declared paths only, one reading of a path, every identity header removed, size, time and rate limits per client address	component_perimeter_config.go; run against the proxy itself (§2.14)
Publishing proxy: passing the caller's credential to the app (authMode: app)	Only for an entry approved as that kind; Cookie and identity headers still removed; a lower rate per client address (§2.14). The platform checks no caller: accepted (AD-1)
Publishing proxy: the values basic, signature, jwt, bearer	The schema refuses them on a perimeter entry, so no entry claims a check that is not made (§2.14)
Publishing an entry: who may approve (can_expose)	The tenant's perimeter approver and the cluster's, named on the Cluster claim, and the cluster's administrator in every tenant (§2.14)
Publishing an entry: approval by the tenant's perimeter approver, of what an installed app declares	The director lists every perimeter entry an installed app declares and refuses an approval of anything else, or with a main-address setting that is not the entry's (internal/director/api/exposure_requests.go, internal/addresses; routing.md §5)
A tenant people sign up to (spec.signUp.enabled)	Off unless the tenant is made with it. The realm takes registrations with the address confirmed by mail and the platform's own proof-of-work check (no third party); an account made that way is in no group and holds no relation, so every enforcement point refuses it, and it is not counted (iam.md §1.1b)
A website on the cluster's main address	§2.10: one tenant only -- the user tenant under single, or the tenant the claim names under either mode -- two people say so, the approver acknowledges the rule. A script there can disturb sign-in on the other addresses
Address names the platform keeps	internal/hostnames, asked by the director and the operator (§2.11)
Default profiles the installer places	Written only when the file hashes to the digest its catalog's index lists, or to a pin, with its bundle and origin (§2.11). The index is not signed. The operator holds the Component it creates for a default profile to the bundle recorded with the profile; nothing apart from the profile states that digest
Mail: one proxy faces the internet, the mail servers do not	kernel/services/mail-edge, in system-mail-dmz: PROXY protocol, TLS passed through, limits per client address (§2.8). Egress from system-mail is open
A mailbox opened with a sign-in token	Only for an app that declares requires.services.mail.imap.tokenSignIn, by the scope mailbox (§2.16)
A catalog kept as an OCI artifact	Read with the credential of a repository its owner declared, the registry held to the address rules, manifest and layer to their digests (§2.17)
Sign-in sidecar	Only from a cluster catalog's bundle pinned by digest, never in the kernel realm (§2.12). It can become anybody in its app
The rights check for a component (requires.services.rights)	A key per component for one question at the bouncer -- may this person use that app of my tenant -- instead of the store's key (rights_check.go, internal/bouncer/check.go). Platform-trust profiles only
A removed person's mailbox	Whoever removes the person chooses archive or delete; no default, and the registrar refuses a removal without the choice. The registrar writes the choice down (MailboxRemoval, the one kind it may write in the cluster) and has no access to system-mail. The operator acts only on an address of the tenant's mail domain that no person of any realm on that domain holds, after the address's mail passwords are gone (mail.md §5c). Mail to the address is refused at RCPT (550, unknown recipient) while the record stands and nobody holds the address; a deleted mailbox's record is removed after 30 days, and the recipient policy decides again from then
A tenant's backup and deletion	A bundle (format 4) holds what a deletion destroys, mailboxes included, and a deletion destroys the mailboxes. It holds each app's own secrets, encrypted by the operator, and a restore sets them at the app's own paths. The cluster signs the manifest and not the artifacts (§6.4). Rights recorded as granted come back only from a bundle this cluster signed, taken on it, of a tenant of the same name; from any other they are named instead (data-lifecycle.md)
Approval path for profile-declared egress	requires.privileges.egress is a request. A rule reaches the NetworkPolicy only once it was granted by name on the install (internal/security/privilege.go, GrantedEgressRules). The tenant's perimeter approver approves it (can_approve_privilege, which is can_expose, §2.14) and the director writes the grant as a commit (internal/director/api/privileges.go). A pod-security waiver takes effect only where the cluster's allowlist names it (PlatformSecurityPolicy) and the security officer granted it on the install (mac_waiver_reconciler.go): either alone waives nothing, and both are the security officer's (cluster#can_approve: PUT /v1/clusters/{c}/platform-security/waivers, or an approval that names the missing allowlist entry and adds it with the grant), and the tenant's MacWaiversReady condition says which of the two is missing. A grant that is withdrawn or has expired takes the namespace label away at the tenant's next reconcile; nothing reconciles at the moment of expiry. A cluster role is asked for by name, from a set the platform defines, and is bound only where the platform has it, the allowlist permits it for the profile and it was granted on the install (§3.4a). Resource types of a component's own are installed only once break-glass granted them (§3.4b). The granted rules are in the component's policy, component-<name>, whoever renders its chart; it selects a placed component's pods by their release and any other app's by the gentianos.io/app label the operator renders every such chart with, and the tenant's per-app policies carry none. A rule that admits the cluster's own public address -- a granted one, or the App Store app's way out -- also admits the edge's Envoy pods behind it, on the ports the edge Service forwards the admitted ports to (internal/controller/own_public_address.go): from inside the cluster that address is rewritten to those pods before the policy is applied, and they serve nothing there that the internet does not reach.
Pod-security admission (privileged, host ns, non-root, hostPath, caps, priv-esc)	kernel/security/kyverno/policies/
The containers' AppArmor profile on nodes that stack labels	kernel/security/node-apparmor/: a privileged DaemonSet in kernel-admission reloads containerd's default profile with rules for the stacked label cri-containerd.apparmor.d//&unconfined, so processes in one container can signal each other (PostgreSQL's crash recovery needs it). It does nothing where kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined is off; AppArmor stays enforcing
Who may ask the internal CA for a certificate	Kernel and system namespaces only (§12.4)
The internal CA's key	Generated in the vault's PKI engine and never out of it; cert-manager may only ask it to sign, for the role's names (§12.4). Not renewed while the vault is sealed
Who may set a namespace's tier, function and mac-waiver labels	Tier: the installer, provider-kubernetes, the operator. Function: the installer, provider-kubernetes. Mac-waiver: the operator. And system:masters; never Argo CD or provider-helm (§12.4)
What a tenant's chart may create	Installed as provider-helm-tenant-apps, which holds rights in tenant namespaces only: the namespaced kinds tenant charts render, nothing at cluster scope or in another namespace. The kernel's charts, and the charts of a profile bundle's own Composition, are installed as cluster-admin (§12.4)
What ESO reads for a tenant's namespace	A store, a role and a policy per tenant (tenant-default.yaml): that tenant's app, repository and contract credentials, no kernel path, no other tenant's. The kernel's store is usable from kernel and system namespaces and from no tenant's, the platform tenant's included: its desktop's database password is at tenants/platform/apps/shell/database and read through that tenant's own store (§5). No admission rule applies to ExternalSecret, SecretStore or ClusterSecretStore
Gateway rate limit	Envoy's local limit per client address on the identity provider's sign-in pages and on a sign-in sidecar's answer path (edge_rate_limit.go, §2.14). Routes behind a session, the token endpoint and WebSocket duration carry no limit
Caller identity between platform services	The operator's app-lifecycle listener admits its two callers, the director and the usher, by ServiceAccount: each presents a projected token for the audience gentian-os-operator and the operator asks the API server whose it is (internal/applifecycle/auth.go). Every other call between platform services rests on a shared key or on the person's token
One credential per process at the rights store	Each service has its own OpenFGA preshared key, so one can be replaced without the others. OpenFGA cannot tell them apart: each can read and write
Human-identified secret writes (token exchange, no service token)	internal/custodian/
Configuration writes	the director verifies the person and commits; the operator's lifecycle API admits only the director's ServiceAccount to its commands and trusts the X-Gentian-Actor name it passes
OpenBao policy per tenant	tenant-default.yaml
Record of administrative changes	A change to declared state is a commit the director writes, naming the person, the relation and the object that allowed it; the administration console lists them (/admin/changes). A change to a person is recorded by the registrar with who asked and what allowed it (internal/registrar/record). Sign-ins are written by the realm, and the bouncer records each allow and refusal. A secret read is not recorded
Decision log, request-id correlation	The bouncer records every decision with its request id.
Commit signing and verification	The director signs every commit (internal/director/gitops/signing.go); the installer signs its own with the break-glass key, found by its recorded id (scripts/lib/signing.sh). Argo CD verifies through the AppProject's sourceIntegrity and its keyring (step B-10). A repository without key ids renders no policy, and the director then commits unsigned and says so
Images named by release	No image under kernel/, charts/ or crossplane/ may name latest, and the model gateway's is held to tag and digest (make lint-image-pins, §2.9). Other images are pinned by tag; the Keycloak event listener's follows a branch tag
Image signature verification	Kyverno checks the signature on ghcr.io/gentian-org/* in tenant namespaces in Audit mode, so a failure is reported and not refused
What the installer downloads	The OpenBao CLI is fetched from the release's address and held to a checksum (make test-openbao-cli-download). The default profiles are held to the digest their catalog's index lists, or to a pin (make test-default-profile-digest); the index itself is unsigned (above)
Rotation rolling app workloads (Reloader)	annotation on the operator Deployment and a few kernel services (Keycloak, Redis, Dovecot). No composition adds it to a tenant app; an app is rolled only where its profile sets the annotation in its own chart values, as some catalog profiles do

Keycloak runs with its release's default features and none added; what that leaves reachable, and why each newer capability stays inert, is listed in iam.md §1.10. The identity host's public paths are /auth/realms/ and /auth/resources/, so a realm-level endpoint a new Keycloak release adds is public unless the realm keeps it off: check that list on every Keycloak upgrade.

3.1 Component roles

Component	Role	License
Keycloak	Authentication authority + token issuer (who you are). Per-tenant realms (not Organizations-as-isolation); each realm signs its own people in; SAML/OIDC brokering; token exchange where §3.0 lists it. See iam.md, admin-console.md.	Apache 2.0
OpenFGA	ReBAC authorization PDP (what you may do). The model holds people, groups, the cluster, tenants and apps.	Apache 2.0
Director	Turns an authorized request into a signed commit to the deployments repository. It asks OpenFGA before each one and writes nothing there. Keycloak decides no permission; OpenFGA changes no identity.	cmd/director
Operator, as the store's writer	The authorization store is written by the operator and by nothing else on purpose: role-to-group assignments from the Cluster claim, tenants and apps from what Argo CD applied, and membership as group#member tuples from Keycloak's signed event-listener statements -- a projection, never edited in place. The process holding the push credential holds no reason to write a relation. What enforces "on purpose" is weak: OpenFGA cannot tell its preshared keys apart, and each can write.	authz_projection_reconciler.go, membership_listener.go
Provisioning bridge	The operator makes an IntegrationBinding for each pair of installed apps that share a contract and turns an AppGrant into the network path and the keys of §3.4. Neither reaches the graph. Group membership arrives as events (row above). The operator holds Keycloak's master administrator credential, for the Jobs that configure realms.	integration_binding_controller.go, contract_keys.go
MAC backbone	K8s namespaces per tenant, NetworkPolicy default-deny egress in those namespaces, Kyverno pod-security admission.	Apache 2.0 / OSS
PEP	Named enforcement points calling OpenFGA Check: the bouncer behind the Gateway, the director, the custodian, the usher and the registrar call it (§3.0), over OpenFGA's own API.	OSS

3.2 Design rationale

For a greenfield, cloud-only OS:

• Keycloak-native identity. Keycloak owns identities per tenant realm, backed by its own Postgres, and is the only place membership is changed. OpenFGA holds a projection of it, fed by Keycloak's event listener, to compute may — authority is separated, not copies (principle 2).
• OpenFGA ReBAC replaces coarse group-only RBAC. One relationship graph holds people, groups, the cluster, tenants and apps (§3.0) — no role explosion.
• Layered isolation (§2) — MAC backbone, identity, and authorization are independent enforcement planes.

3.3 Reference architecture

Decision flow: (1) A person authenticates to Keycloak → OIDC token. (2) Keycloak's event listener pushes signed membership changes to the operator, which writes them as group#member tuples — a projection, never edited in place; the operator also writes structure (roles, tenants, installs) from the objects Argo CD applied from the director's commits, so a relation follows a commit only once it has been applied; IntegrationBinding reconciles cross-app credentials. (3) PEP receives request + token and calls OpenFGA Check with the relation and the object. Memberships are already in the graph and no group travels in a token for a platform decision. (4) OpenFGA traverses the graph (principal → group → resource) → allow/deny. (5) Independently, the MAC backbone enforces tenant isolation and egress regardless of the authZ result. Step (5) runs for tenant namespaces and, for the platform's namespaces, as far as §3.0 says.

3.4 Application permissions — catalog contracts and grants

What an app needs from the platform and from other apps is declared in its ComponentProfile. A declaration is a request and grants nothing. Access to another app is wired by an IntegrationBinding and limited by an AppGrant. This mirrors Android's manifest (<uses-permission> = intent) vs. the separate platform/user grant — the app declares; it never grants itself access to another tenant or app.

A contract between two components the platform places itself, both of trust tier platform, is granted by the platform: where the consumer names the provider and the capabilities it asks for, and the provider provides the contract, the director's placement worker writes the grant into every tenant that has both, as platform:placement (internal/placement, preApproved). That is how the App Store app reaches the desktop's API (desktop-api). The desktop still decides each call on the person's own token. A profile may name valueMapping.platform.desktopUrlKey instead, which opens the same path without a binding (internal/controller/desktop_access.go); the schema refuses the key below trust tier platform. Field reference and deployment flow: app-catalog.md.

Terminology — manifest language vs CRD fields

Concept	ComponentProfile field	Type
Contracts the app provides to other apps	spec.provides[]	{ name, protocol?, endpoint? }
Contracts the app may consume from other apps	spec.integrations[]	{ contract, provider?, capabilities? }
Platform services (identity, database, object storage, cache, mail, model gateway, …)	spec.requires.services	Separate from contracts
What goes beyond the default posture (pod-security waiver, egress, cluster roles, API extensions)	spec.requires.privileges	Requests, answered per install (§3.0)
Where the chart takes what was provided	spec.package.valueMapping	Chart value keys per service

A contract is a name (file-store, project-management) two profiles agree on. Nothing in the cluster holds a contract's definition or checks a call against one. A provider may say where it answers one (endpoint: a Service of its own, the port its pods listen on, a path); the binding carries that, the consumer is told the address and a grant opens that port only. What is asked there is the two apps' business.

Three layers — declaration, wiring, authorization

Layer	Object	Scope	Written by
Declaration	ComponentProfile	Cluster (one per catalog entry)	The catalog's maintainer; it reaches the cluster in a bundle fetched from a catalog
Wiring	IntegrationBinding	Tenant namespace, one per consumer and contract	The operator, when the consumer and a provider are both in Tenant.spec.apps
Grant	AppGrant	Tenant namespace, one per consuming app	The director commits it into the Tenant (spec.grants, the patch grants.yaml), for a person who holds can_grant on the tenant, with who granted it (from the token) and when, and a reason where one is given; the operator makes the AppGrant from it and removes one whose entry is gone. Nothing else writes one

Do not conflate them:

• requires.services — what the platform provides before the app runs (an OIDC client, a database, a mailbox, …). The credentials are written to OpenBao and reach the chart through package.valueMapping (§8). Not a contract between apps.
• provides / integrations — what the app offers to, or may use from, other apps of the same tenant. An absent provider is normal.
• IntegrationBinding — the record that a consumer and a provider of one contract are both installed, with the capabilities the consumer's profile asks for.

1. Declaration — ComponentProfile (developer-authored, static)

ComponentProfile is cluster-scoped — one object per catalog entry, shared by every tenant that installs it. It is the upper bound of what the app can ask for, not an authorization decision.

apiVersion: gentianos.io/v1alpha1
kind: ComponentProfile
metadata:
  name: demo-app                     # cluster-scoped
spec:
  classes: [app]
  launch: tile
  trustTier: certified
  version: "1.0.0"

  package:
    chart:
      repository: oci://registry.example/charts
      name: demo-app
      version: "1.0.0"
    valueMapping:                    # where what was provided goes in the chart's values
      oidc:
        issuerKey: "oidc.issuer"
        clientIdKey: "oidc.clientId"
        clientSecretKey: "oidc.clientSecret"
      database:
        hostKey: "database.host"
        nameKey: "database.name"
        userKey: "database.user"
        passwordKey: "database.password"

  requires:
    services:                        # platform services, not contracts
      identity:
        oidc:
          clientId: demo-app
          accessType: CONFIDENTIAL
      database:
        engine: postgresql

  provides:                          # contracts this app serves to other apps
    - name: project-management
      protocol: http-json
      endpoint:                      # optional: where it is answered
        service: demo-app-api
        port: 8000

  integrations:                      # contracts this app may consume, if a provider is installed
    - contract: file-store
      provider: file-store-app       # optional: the provider's profile name
      capabilities: [webdav:read, webdav:write]

  expose:
    - name: web
      surface: gateway
      authMode: oidc
      subDomain: demo
      backend:
        service: demo-app
        port: 8080
      tile:
        displayName: "Demo App"
        logo: …
        relation: can_launch

A tenant's administrator installs an app by its profile name (an entry in Tenant.spec.apps, written by the director) and cannot edit the profile.

2. Wiring — IntegrationBinding (operator-authored, per tenant)

For each spec.integrations[] entry of an installed app the operator looks for a provider among the tenant's other installed apps: the profile the entry names in provider, or else any whose spec.provides carries the contract. Where it finds one it makes an IntegrationBinding in the tenant's namespace and removes it when either app goes:

apiVersion: gentianos.io/v1alpha1
kind: IntegrationBinding
metadata:
  name: demo--consumer-app--file-store     # <tenant>--<consumer>--<contract>
  namespace: tenant-demo
spec:
  contract: file-store
  provider:
    app: provider-app
    namespace: tenant-demo
  consumer:
    app: consumer-app
    namespace: tenant-demo
  capabilities: [webdav:read, webdav:write]
  auth:
    method: api-key
    vaultPath: gentian-os/tenants/demo/contracts/file-store

The operator writes a generated password to vaultPath, once per tenant and contract, for every contract an installed app maps under package.valueMapping.integrations, and an empty endpoint and user beside it. A component that maps the contract gets them as chart values: the consumer the password and the endpoint, the provider the same password to check its callers' with. The endpoint is filled in from the binding: the address of the provider's endpoint (http://<service>.<namespace>.svc.cluster.local:<port><path>), or for calendar and contacts the provider's DAV address. This delivery does not wait for a grant, and every consumer of one contract in a tenant holds the same password. The binding is topology and secret wiring, not a per-person permission.

3. Grant — AppGrant (tenant-authored, per install)

An AppGrant names, for one consuming app, the capabilities of each contract it may use. The director writes it as a commit (PUT /v1/tenants/{t}/grants/{app}, relation can_grant).

apiVersion: gentianos.io/v1alpha1
kind: AppGrant
metadata:
  name: demo-app
  namespace: tenant-demo
spec:
  app: demo-app
  consume:
    - contract: file-store
      granted: [webdav:read]             # webdav:write withheld
  allowConsumers:                        # the provider's side; read by nothing
    - app: crm-app
      contract: project-management
      scope: [tasks:read]

What a grant does (tenant_network_policy.go, internal/kernel/netpolicy, contract_keys.go):

• The network path. A tenant's namespace is closed in both directions. For a binding whose consumer was granted at least one capability, two NetworkPolicies let the consumer's pods reach the provider's and the provider's admit them, on the endpoint's port where the binding carries one. Without a grant neither exists.
• A key per consumer. The consumer gets a Secret contract-key-<consumer>-<contract> with a random key, and the provider a Secret contract-callers-<provider> with the SHA-256 of each granted consumer's key and its name, so a provider can tell which of its consumers is calling. Both go when the grant goes. Mounting the Secret, sending the key and checking it are the two apps' own work; the platform checks no call.

What it does not do:

• Capabilities are not enforced. Any granted capability opens the whole path: to the endpoint's port, or without an endpoint to the provider's pods. The list is written on the policy as a label and nowhere else.
• Nothing reaches the rights store. The model has a contract type; nothing writes it and no enforcement point asks about a call between two apps.
• Nothing is granted at install. The operator writes no grant and changes none; its role in the cluster can neither create nor patch one. A declared integration stays closed until the tenant's administrator grants it, and a grant narrower than the declaration is what takes effect. The binding says how much of what it asks for was granted: its Granted condition is True when all of it was, and False with the reason NotGranted or PartlyGranted otherwise, naming the capabilities that are missing. The Integrations screen of the administration console shows the same.

Revoking a grant removes the network path and both key Secrets in one reconcile. It does not change the shared password at vaultPath, which stays in the consumer's values until the app is rolled.

3a. Cluster roles — named by the platform, never written by a profile

Referred to as §3.4a. An app that needs to read something of the cluster through the Kubernetes API, or to write one of the platform's kinds, asks for a cluster role by name:

spec:
  requires:
    privileges:
      clusterRoles:
        - name: read-nodes               # one of the platform's roles
          serviceAccount: dashboard      # the account the chart runs its pods under
          reason: "The dashboard lists node capacity."

The operator binds the role to that ServiceAccount, in the component's own namespace, with a ClusterRoleBinding, and only while all of these hold (internal/security/cluster_roles.go, internal/controller/component_cluster_roles.go):

Condition	Who decides	Reason on the Component when it is missing
The name is in the platform's set	The platform, in this repository	UnknownRole
The cluster permits it for this profile: PlatformSecurityPolicy.spec.allowedClusterRoles[], {profile, role}	Whoever holds can_set_admission on the cluster (PUT /v1/clusters/{c}/platform-security, {"allowedClusterRoles": […]})	NotAllowed
A live grant clusterRoles/<name> is on the install	The security officer (cluster#can_approve), as for a pod-security waiver; break-glass (cluster#can_set_admission) for a role that writes	NotGranted

The Component's ClusterRolesBound condition names each request and what became of it. Two more reasons bind nothing: NoServiceAccount (the entry names none, or names default, which every pod without an account of its own runs under) and RoleNotInstalled (the platform's ClusterRole object is not on the cluster, or does not carry the platform's label). A binding goes at the component's next reconcile when the grant is withdrawn or has expired, when the cluster stops permitting it (a change of the policy wakes the component), when the profile stops asking, and with the component. Nothing reconciles at the moment a grant expires.

A profile's own rules are never made into a role. rules is accepted on an entry; such an entry binds nothing and the condition says FreeFormRules. The install waits for the grant of every privilege the profile asks for, this kind included.

The set is the platform's. It holds one role:

Role	Allows	Approved by
tenant-exports	start, read and remove TenantExports in every tenant's namespace; read which tenants there are	break-glass

An export a component starts is held by admission (charts/gentian-os/templates/tenant-export-guard.yaml) to what the tenant and the cluster declared: it goes to the cluster's storage, the tenant's backup policy or a store the tenant declared, never to an endpoint the export names, and it names no recipients of its own and no passphrase: it is encrypted to the cluster's recovery keys, or to the keys the tenant's store declares when it goes to one. The operator's own exports, for the Admin Console's export and the platform's schedules, and a person's are not held by it.

A role is added in this repository, never by a catalog or a tenant, in three places that a test holds together (internal/security/cluster_roles_test.go):

1. The ClusterRole in charts/gentian-os/templates/profile-cluster-roles.yaml, named gentian-profile-role-<name> and labeled gentianos.io/profile-cluster-role: <name>. Read verbs only, named resources, no Secrets, no wildcard, nothing of RBAC or admission, no nodes/proxy, no impersonation; the test refuses anything else. A role marked as one that writes may also create, update, patch and delete, kinds of gentianos.io only.
2. The name, with what it allows in an approver's words and whether it writes, in PlatformClusterRoles. A role that writes is break-glass's to approve (security.PrivilegeApprover).
3. The operator's own permissions, as markers beside the reconciler: read on clusterroles, read, create and delete on clusterrolebindings, and bind on clusterroles held to the names of the set.

3b. API extensions — a component's own types, approved by break-glass

Referred to as §3.4b. A component that needs resource types of its own writes them out in its profile, so that what is approved is what is installed:

spec:
  requires:
    privileges:
      apiExtensions:
        - name: schedules
          group: backup.example.org      # the component's own group
          serviceAccount: backup         # reads the types, writes their status
          definitions:                   # CustomResourceDefinitions, apiextensions.k8s.io/v1
            - {apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1, kind: CustomResourceDefinition, ...}
          reason: "The add-on's schedules."

A chart's own definitions are never installed: app charts render with skipCRDs, and a tenant's chart may not write a definition. The operator installs the profile's (internal/controller/component_api_extensions.go) once a live grant apiExtensions/<name> is on the install, which only break-glass gives (cluster#can_set_admission), and only when every definition:

Holds	Reason on the Component when it does not
is a CustomResourceDefinition of the request's group, named <plural>.<group>, namespaced, without a conversion webhook (the API server would call the component on every read)	InvalidDefinition
is in a group that is neither Kubernetes' (*.k8s.io, *.kubernetes.io) nor the platform's (*.gentianos.io), and serves no type of anybody else	InvalidDefinition, GroupTaken
is a new type, or one the operator installed for the same profile	TypeTaken

The APIExtensionsInstalled condition names each request and what became of it; a granted request that could not be installed holds the install. The admission guard charts/gentian-os/templates/api-extensions-guard.yaml holds the operator's own writes of definitions to the same rules, so a fault in the operator cannot change a type it did not install. The operator lists no definitions; it reads them by name and learns a group's other types from discovery.

The component's ServiceAccount reads its types, and writes their status, through one ClusterRole, gentian-api-extensions, whose rules the operator keeps to the installed types and which it binds to the account while the grant lives. The operator may change that role and no other (escalate and bind held to its name). Every component bound to it reads every add-on's types; none writes an object of them. The objects are declared by people, through the director, as files of a tenant's directory (PUT /v1/tenants/{t}/extensions/{group}/{resource}/{name}, can_set_policy), or of the platform tenant's for what is the cluster's (PUT /v1/clusters/{c}/extensions/…, can_configure), each checked against its type's schema before it is committed, and only of a type installed and granted now. They are read back through the usher (GET /v1/tenants/{t}/extensions/{group}/{resource}, can_view; GET /v1/clusters/{c}/extensions/…, can_audit), which relays the operator's answer: the objects of that one type in that tenant's namespace, with what the add-on reports of each. The operator reads them through a second role kept the same way, gentian-api-extensions-reader (get, list and watch on the installed types, no status), which the chart binds to it.

An approval names what it approved. A grant of apiExtensions/<name> carries the digest of the request as the approver read it (digest, sha256 of its group, ServiceAccount and definitions as JSON with sorted keys, security.APIExtensionDigest); the pending request reports the digest an approval must name, and kubectl gentian apps approve sends it. A later version of the profile that changes the definitions is not answered by the grant, and the install waits for a new one.

A grant that is withdrawn, has expired or names other definitions unbinds the role at the next reconcile, and the install waits again. The types stay: removing a definition deletes every object of it, which is a person's decision.

The initial install approves the add-ons it places. Running the installer for a cluster's first time is break-glass authority, so the run that writes the Cluster claim approves every apiExtensions and clusterRoles request of the default add-ons it placed (the backup scheduler, backup-scheduler-ee): the platform tenant's privileges.yaml, with the installer as approver and the digest it computed from the profile, and the role permitted in the cluster's values, which the director starts the allowlist from (scripts/lib/bootstrap.sh, _initial_install_approvals). No later run approves anything: an add-on placed by an update, a changed request and a withdrawn approval are break-glass's. --disable-api-extensions and --no-extra-services place no add-on and approve nothing.

4. Runtime authorization — computed at the PEP (per request)

A person signs in at their tenant's realm. The front door asks the rights store whether that person may use the app (can_use on app:<tenant>/<profile>) on every request of a session route (§3.0). The right comes from the app's Keycloak group, gentian:tenant:<t>:app:<profile>, whose members the operator projects into the store. App administrators are the members of gentian:tenant:<t>:app-admins; the operator gives them the role each app's profile names in spec.hooks.provisioning.privilegedRole (see app-profile-guide.md §6). People and groups are administered in the administration console. Between two apps there is the network path and the key of step 3, and no check by the platform.

---

4. Secrets topology

The credentials of the platform's services and of apps are kept in OpenBao and reach a workload as a Kubernetes Secret that ESO writes. No secret is put in Git, in a CR spec or in a ConfigMap.

Some secrets are Kubernetes Secrets that never pass through OpenBao: the installer's copy of the master password and of the kernel credentials derived from it, in kernel-provisioning, from which the Cluster Composition makes the OpenBao paths (§7); the signing key of Keycloak's event listener, with its public half in kernel-control; the keys of a granted contract (§3.4); and TLS keys, which cert-manager holds.

5. Path Layout

All under the KV mount secret.

gentian-os/
├── kernel/                           # the platform's own; no tenant in the path
│   ├── internal/master-password      #   value, salt (§6)
│   ├── database/                     #   postgresql, mariadb, cnpg, portal-shell
│   ├── cache/redis
│   ├── storage/                      #   s3, s3/jwt (the store's signing keys), registry
│   ├── identity/keycloak-bootstrap   #   Keycloak's bootstrap administrator
│   ├── authz/openfga                 #   the rights store's preshared key
│   ├── oidc/openbao                  #   OpenBao's own sign-in client
│   ├── mail/                         #   postfix, dovecot, smtp, relay
│   ├── dns/{provider}                #   DNS-01 credential (cloudflare, route53, …)
│   ├── edge/cf-tunnel
│   ├── repositories/{name}           #   deployments and source repositories
│   ├── signing/director              #   the director's commit-signing key
│   ├── backup/                       #   recipients, destination, identity, sources/{name}
│   ├── llm, llm-providers            #   model gateway and its upstream keys
│   ├── usage-statistics
│   └── argocd/github-webhook
│
└── tenants/
    └── {tenant}/
        ├── apps/
        │   └── {app}/                #   an extension of an app: {app}-{extension}
        │       ├── oidc              #   issuer, client_id, client_secret
        │       ├── database          #   host, user, password, database name
        │       ├── s3                #   access_key, secret_key, bucket
        │       ├── cache             #   host, port, password
        │       ├── smtp              #   host, user, password
        │       ├── imap              #   host, port
        │       ├── llm               #   base URL and key at the model gateway
        │       ├── internal/{name}   #   a secret the profile asks to have generated
        │       └── derived/{key}     #   a key the profile declares under secrets.derived
        ├── repositories/
        │   └── {repository-name}     #   username, password of a declared repository
        ├── contracts/
        │   └── {contract-name}       #   shared credential of a binding (§3.4)
        └── backup/                   #   destination, identity

The path helpers are in internal/kernel/secrets/paths.go.

One path is outside this tree: identity/portal-admin, directly under the mount, where the installer keeps three client secrets on a cluster with secretMode: random (§6.3). No policy but an administrator's reaches it.

Who may read what:

• A policy per tenant, <tenant>-tenant-policy (tenant-default.yaml), covers gentian-os/tenants/<tenant>/* and nothing of another tenant.

• ESO reads through two kinds of store, and which one an ExternalSecret may name follows from its namespace.

  • The kernel's store, openbao (cluster-default.yaml). Its policy eso-read covers all of gentian-os/kernel/*, the master password and the salt included, and every tenant's apps/, repositories/, contracts/ and backup/; only the backup identities are denied to it. The store's conditions admit the namespaces labeled gentianos.io/tier kernel or system, and no namespace by name. ESO refuses an ExternalSecret that names it from anywhere else, before OpenBao is asked.
  • A store per tenant, openbao-tenant-<tenant> (tenant-default.yaml), with a role and a policy of its own, eso-tenant-<tenant>. The policy reads that tenant's apps/, repositories/ and contracts/. It denies every kernel path and the tenant's backup/, and grants nothing of another tenant. The store admits the one namespace that carries gentianos.io/tier: tenant and gentianos.io/tenant: <tenant>. Every ExternalSecret the Compositions and the operator put in a tenant's namespace names it.

  The platform tenant is no exception. Its desktop keeps its data on the kernel's PostgreSQL, in a database of its own (portal_shell) under a role of its own that owns that database and nothing else. The role's password is at gentian-os/tenants/platform/apps/shell/database, laid out as any tenant's desktop database credential: the installer seeds it with the kernel's credentials, the kernel's database chart sets the role's password from it, and the operator's ExternalSecret in tenant-platform reads it through openbao-tenant-platform. The platform tenant's administrators' policy covers the path, as it covers every credential of that tenant.

  So an ExternalSecret in a tenant's namespace, whoever wrote it, reaches that tenant's app, repository and contract credentials and nothing else: no kernel path, no other tenant's path, whatever key it names. What the policies mean is run against an OpenBao by make test-policy-openbao; which store each rendered ExternalSecret names is held by a test over the Compositions' golden files (internal/kernel/secrets). None of it has run on a cluster yet.

  What this does not close:

  • Every one of these roles is bound to ESO's own ServiceAccount. Whoever controls the ESO pod signs in as any of them and reads what eso-read reads.
  • The conditions go by the namespace an ExternalSecret is in. Whoever can write one into a kernel or system namespace, and read the Secret it makes there, reaches the kernel's paths. A tenant's administrator cannot; a tenant's chart cannot, since it is installed with rights in the tenant's namespace only (§12.4); a chart of a profile bundle's own Composition still can.
  • Nothing at admission refuses a store. Any ClusterSecretStore may sign in as eso with ESO's ServiceAccount, and one without conditions is usable from every namespace. The API server lets only a cluster administrator and the platform's own controllers create one; a chart has those rights too, and a catalog's Composition has Crossplane's, so either can. Neither is inspected (custom-catalogs.md §7).
  • The master password is still readable by ESO, in the kernel's namespaces, because the probe credreq-master-password reads it (§6.1).
  • Within a tenant every app's credentials are readable from the tenant's one namespace.
  • The cluster's own registry credential (Repository without a tenant, with a namespaceSelector) is a kernel path. Where its selector matches a tenant's namespace, no pull Secret arrives there.

• The director reads repository credentials, a tenant's and the cluster's, under director-repository-read (cluster-default.yaml), to pull a catalog kept as an OCI artifact (§2.17). Read only, on tenants/+/repositories/+ and kernel/repositories/+, and nothing else.

5.1 Repository pull credentials

A tenant's registry repository (Repository, type: oci, spec.tenant set by the director from the authorized route) has its credential at gentian-os/tenants/{tenant}/repositories/{name}. repository-default materializes it as one Secret, repository-{name}-pull, through a ClusterExternalSecret whose selector is exactly gentianos.io/tenant: {tenant} and gentianos.io/tier: tenant — the namespace that tenant's apps run in, not its DMZ and no other tenant's. The Secret is a dockerconfigjson that also carries username and password, so a kubelet and provider-helm read the same object.

The component reconciler names that Secret, never its content: as chart.pullSecretRef on the Release of a chart whose address lies inside exactly one repository the tenant declared (same host and port, the repository's path a prefix by whole segments), and in imagePullSecrets / global.imagePullSecrets of every chart the tenant installs, after registry-credentials.

The pull Secret is read through the tenant's own store, openbao-tenant-{tenant} (§5), whose role reads that tenant's repositories/* and no other's. The Composition also refuses to make a pull Secret for a tenant's repository whose path is outside that tenant's repositories/, so a wrong path yields no object instead of one that never syncs.

What this does not give:

• provider-helm is one process for all tenants, and runs as cluster-admin, installing a tenant's chart as a narrower account (§12.4) but pulling it as itself. It keeps pulled charts in a cache keyed by chart name and version and stays logged in to a registry host once any Release has presented a credential for it. A chart one tenant pulled can therefore be installed by another whose profile names the same chart, until the provider restarts. The credential is not disclosed; the chart is.
• An image already on a node is started for any pod with imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent without a pull, so without asking for a credential.
• A chart must take imagePullSecrets or global.imagePullSecrets as a value. One that takes neither pulls its images without the tenant's credential, as it does without the cluster's.
• A bearer credential yields no pull Secret: both readers need a username.

6. Secret Generation Mode

secretMode on the Cluster claim, in the deployments repository, selects how the platform makes a credential that nothing has stored yet: the kernel's credentials and each app's. Two kernel credentials are computed from the master password in both modes (§6.3).

Mode	Claim value	A generated credential is
Deterministic (default)	secretMode: derived	Computed from the master password and a per-cluster salt. A rebuild with both yields the same values.
Random	secretMode: random	Drawn at random, once, and stored in OpenBao. Nothing reproduces it: the stored copy is the only one.

Two readers act on it. The installer reads the claim (SECRET_MODE) when it makes the kernel's credentials. The operator reads it from the gentian-cluster-config ConfigMap, which the Cluster Composition writes from the claim, each time it makes a credential for an app (ClusterSecretMode in internal/controller/cluster_config.go).

The mode is chosen at the first install. Changing it later converts nothing. A credential that exists stays as it is, in both directions; only a credential made afterwards follows the new mode. A cluster switched to random therefore still holds derived credentials, and one switched to derived still holds random ones that no rebuild reproduces. One path is an exception and makes a switch back to derived harmful: the installer rewrites gentian-os/kernel/llm on every run, and under derived it writes the derived keys over whatever was there, while the model gateway's database still has the old password.

Under random, OpenBao holds the only live copy of all but an app's own secrets, and its snapshot is the only other. Of the stored credentials a tenant's bundle holds the apps' own secrets and no other, in both modes (§6.4), and the recovery kit holds the master password and not what was drawn at random. A vault on Raft storage is snapshotted every day by the CronJob openbao-snapshot in the vault's namespace, with a token whose policy reads sys/storage/raft/snapshot and nothing else, and the snapshot is encrypted to the backup recipient inside the pod before it is written to the platform's object store (recovery.md §4). The transit seal that unseals the vault is snapshotted the same way, by openbao-transit-snapshot in the seal's namespace with a role of the seal's own, because the key that unseals the vault exists nowhere else: it is not exportable, and is not made so. A restored seal opens with the recovery kit's TRANSIT_UNSEAL_KEY. An instance on file storage is not snapshotted; the operator says so on the Cluster claim's status. What follows:

• A tenant's backup, restore and import work as under derived. The one kind of credential an app's restored data depends on, the app's own secrets, is in the bundle and is set again by a restore and by an import (§6.4). No other stored credential is changed by a restore, and an import makes new ones, in both modes.
• A cluster rebuilt from the recovery kit gets new kernel credentials and new credentials for every app, where derived arrives at the old ones. The rebuild makes every database, bucket and client anew with them, so nothing is locked out, and each tenant's bundle brings its apps' own secrets with their data.
• OpenBao's storage lost on a cluster that keeps running is the case random does not survive. Under derived the installer and the operator write the same values again, from the master password and the salt the recovery kit holds. Under random they write new ones, which the running databases, buckets and sign-in clients were not created with, and every service and app is locked out of its own store until each credential is set by hand, unless the vault is restored from its snapshot (recovery.md §4): a cluster that runs random needs its vault and its seal on Raft, and the recovery kit, whose backup identity opens the snapshots and whose TRANSIT_UNSEAL_KEY opens the seal restored from its own, which then unseals the vault. The snapshots sit on the cluster's own object store; a copy off the cluster is the operator's to make.

No person's password is derived or generated. The platform administrator and each tenant's administrator set their own through a single-use activation link (iam.md §1.4). The one administrator credential among the kernel's is Keycloak's own bootstrap administrator (identity/keycloak-bootstrap), which the operator uses (§3.0).

6.1 Deterministic mode (derived)

The installer derives each kernel credential with one function, _derived in scripts/lib/derive.sh, which the bootstrap library, the portal login and scripts/bootstrap/seed-openbao.sh all call:

hex(HMAC-SHA256(key = MASTER_PASSWORD + DERIVATION_SALT,
                message = "<context>:<purpose>"))    # 64 hex characters

The key reaches the HMAC through the environment, never as an argument, and scripts/tests/derivation-vectors.txt holds the values it must give.

The salt is 16 random bytes generated at the first install and stored beside the master password.

Properties:

1. One secret to protect instead of hundreds — with the salt.
2. Idempotent re-seeding — rerunning the installer produces identical credentials, and an existing path is never overwritten (§7).
3. Disaster recovery — if OpenBao is lost, the kernel credentials can be regenerated from the master password and the salt. The salt lives only in OpenBao and in the recovery kit (./install.sh --export-recovery-kit), so the master password alone reproduces nothing.

The master password and the salt are written to gentian-os/kernel/internal/master-password (steps B-07-crossplane-secrets and B-08-seed-secrets), and to the Secret gentian-os-master-password in kernel-provisioning, which the Cluster claim refers to.

Per-app credentials are derived by the operator. It reads the master password and the salt once at start and derives the one credential a requirement needs — HKDF-SHA256 with the credential's own OpenBao path as salt (internal/kernel/secrets, Deriver, Seeder) — and writes it to that app's path. An install Job of the platform's receives its credential through its own ExternalSecret and never sees the master password. An app uninstalled and installed again gets the same credentials.

What still reaches the master password, and should not:

• ESO's kernel policy reads all of gentian-os/kernel/* (§5), this path with it. One ExternalSecret does read it: credreq-master-password, the probe that tells the custodian and make check-credentials whether the master password has been supplied. It creates no Secret, but ESO fetches the value to answer. The path cannot be denied to ESO, as the backup key's is, until that one credential's presence is established some other way. The salt is a field of the same path, so it is readable wherever the master password is. The store that reads it is usable from the kernel and system namespaces and from no tenant's, the platform tenant's included (§5): an ExternalSecret in a tenant's namespace does not reach it.
• A chart is installed with the rights of the whole cluster, and a catalog's Composition is rendered with Crossplane's. Either can read the Secret gentian-os-master-password, or make a store of its own (§5). What a chart contains is not inspected.

The Secret gentian-os-master-password in kernel-provisioning is not made by ESO: the installer writes it directly (step B-07-crossplane-secrets).

6.2 Random mode (random)

Each credential is generated independently, by the installer with

openssl rand -hex 32

and by the operator from crypto/rand. The master password is still stored in OpenBao in this mode, and the operator still reads it at start; the installer uses it for the two kernel credentials that stay derived (§6.3), and the operator for nothing.

Properties:

1. Independent of the master password — whoever learns the master password and the salt learns none of the credentials made at random. The two kernel credentials that stay derived (§6.3) are the exception.
2. Independent of each other — one credential can be changed without affecting another.
3. Made once — the first value stored at a path stays the path's value (§7). The operator hands on a random value only after reading it back from the path; where the read fails it reports an error and tries again, because a value it could not read back may not be the stored one.
4. Requires a backup of OpenBao — see the note at the top of this section.

6.3 Scope of each mode

• Kernel credentials — written at cluster install into gentian-os/kernel/*, derived or random as the mode says. Credentials a person supplies (a DNS token, a mail relay's password, a registry login) are stored as given, by the installer or, once the cluster runs, by the custodian.
• The platform tenant's desktop database password — written at cluster install with the kernel credentials, derived or random as the mode says, into gentian-os/tenants/platform/apps/shell/database. A cluster that held it as a property of kernel/database/postgresql keeps that value at the new path where the installer can read the vault; where it cannot, the value is made again by the mode and the role is set to it.
• Keys no mode applies to — the object store's signing keys (kernel/storage/s3/jwt) are random in either mode, generated once by the installer (B-08) and never overwritten: nothing else the cluster holds may reproduce them. The internal CA's key is not a KV path at all: the vault's PKI engine generated it and keeps it (§12.4).
• Per-app credentials — created by the operator when a tenant installs an app, in gentian-os/tenants/<tenant>/apps/<app>/*, and likewise derived or random as the mode says: the database password, the bucket's key pair, the cache password, the sign-in client's secret, the model gateway key, the password of a contract between two apps, and each key a profile declares under secrets.derived (below).
• Where the operator cannot learn the mode — the ConfigMap unreadable, or holding a value that is neither mode — it makes no credential and the reconcile is tried again. A ConfigMap that is not there yet, or that carries no mode, reads as derived. Under derived, the operator generates random values only when it finds no master password at start; a key declared under secrets.derived is the exception and is not made at all then.
• A key a profile declares under secrets.derived (Open WebUI's WEBUI_SECRET_KEY is the one in the catalog) is stored at …/apps/<app>/derived/<key> and delivered in the Secret llm-credentials-<app> the operator writes into the tenant's namespace for an app that declares the model gateway. Under derived it is computed from the master password and the salt, with that path as the context, so it differs per tenant, app and key; under random it is drawn at random. Either way it is stored once and read back, and never made again while it is stored. Without the master password under derived, no value is made, the app's Secret is not written and its release waits; the operator reads the master password at start only, so it has to be restarted once the master password is readable.

An app's own secrets (spec.secrets.generated of its profile and an extension's appSecrets, stored at …/apps/<app>/internal/<name>) follow the mode like the app's other credentials. An app encrypts and signs its data with them, so they travel with the data (§6.4).

A credential a person supplies for an app (spec.secrets.supplied, stored at …/apps/<app>/supplied/<name>, one property per field) is under neither mode: the operator renders it as a CredentialRequirement of the tenant, the tenant's administrator sets it in the Admin Console, the custodian writes it, and the app's credentials Secret reads it from there. Purged with the app's other credentials; not in a bundle (§6.4).

Still derived under random, because each needs a place in OpenBao that nobody has chosen, and neither is part of a tenant's bundle:

• The key the Keycloak event listener signs with. The installer computes the key pair from the master password on every run and writes the two halves to two Kubernetes Secrets; neither half is in OpenBao.
• The kernel realm's own mail login, on a cluster that runs its own mail server. It is asked for twice in one run and held only in Kubernetes Secrets.

Outside the gentian-os/ tree: under random the installer keeps the client secrets of Argo CD, Headlamp and the model gateway's console at identity/portal-admin, directly under the KV mount, and reads them back from there or from the Kubernetes Secret each is mounted from before it draws a new one. Under derived they are computed on every run and are in no vault path.

6.4 An app's own secrets in a tenant's bundle

An app's data is readable only with the secrets it was written with. Made again they are other values wherever the mode is random, and under derived wherever the tenant's name or the cluster's master password is another. So a bundle carries them, in both modes, and a restore sets them.

What a bundle holds. Per app, every secret its profile declares that the vault holds: the generated ones (secrets.generated, an extension's appSecrets) and the keys under secrets.derived (§6.3). One artifact, secrets/<app>.json.age, a document of names and values (bundle.AppSecrets), the declared keys in a section of their own (derived). No other stored credential is in a bundle: a database's password, a bucket's keys, a cache's password, a sign-in client's secret, a model gateway key and a contract's password are made again where the bundle is restored, and no stored data depends on them. A credential a person typed in is not in a bundle either.

How it is protected. The operator reads the values from OpenBao, encrypts them itself with age, to the recipients or the passphrase the rest of the bundle is encrypted with, and uploads the result (internal/backup/secrets.go). The values are in no Job, no Secret, no ConfigMap, no status, not in the manifest and not in bundle-info.json: the manifest names the artifact and a status names the secrets, nothing more.

Who can read it. Whoever holds the key the bundle was encrypted to, and nobody who only reads the backup storage:

• the cluster's backup key: the holder of the recovery kit; and, with spec.backup.escrowIdentity (the default), whoever reads gentian-os/kernel/backup/identity in OpenBao. That is the platform administrators' policy (cluster-admin), which is refused every tenant's own paths: through a bundle and the escrowed key a platform administrator can obtain a tenant's app secrets, as they can its data. It is also the operator, whose policy reads all of gentian-os/*; the secrets operator is denied the path.
• a key or passphrase the requester named: the requester. They asked for a bundle only they can open, and it holds the secrets too. A tenant's own key is made by a person, with age-keygen or in the browser by an add-on, never by a service of the platform. Its private half reaches the cluster only if that person asks for a copy to be kept: the custodian then writes it to gentian-os/tenants/<tenant>/backup/identity for a caller who holds can_write_credential on the tenant whose realm signed them in, and takes the tenant from that realm, never from the request (internal/custodian/backupidentity.go). The custodian's own policy writes the path and cannot read it; no route returns the value, and the one that answers whether a copy is kept reads the path's metadata. The secrets operators are denied the path; the operator's policy reads all of gentian-os/* and so this copy as well, which makes a kept copy readable by whoever runs the cluster. A key that must not be is not kept here.

What a restore does. Before an app's data is replaced, each secret the bundle holds for it is written to gentian-os/tenants/<tenant restored into>/apps/<app>/internal/<name>, and each declared key to …/apps/<app>/derived/<key>, where <name> or <key> is one the app's profile declares on this cluster. The path is built by the operator; the bundle supplies names and values and no path. Nothing is written for an app the restore does not restore, under a name the profile does not declare, or outside the tenant restored into; what the bundle holds besides is named in the result and not written. A bundle of another tenant is not restored at all.

A value that differs from the stored one replaces it: the one exception to §7. The app's ExternalSecrets are then told to read again, a declared key is written into the Secret the operator delivers it in (llm-credentials-<app>), the restore waits until those Secrets hold the new values, the Helm releases that are handed one as a value are upgraded, and only then is the app paused and its data replaced; the app is restarted when the data is in. A secret that has not reached the app after ten minutes fails the restore of that app with its data untouched. Where the stored values are the bundle's already — a restore into the tenant the bundle was taken of, nothing purged — nothing is written and nothing restarted on their account.

An app that was uninstalled with its data kept has its secrets set the same way, with nothing to hand them to: its next install finds them.

A secret the profile declares and the bundle holds no value for is left as it is and named in the result: a format 4 bundle written before declared keys traveled holds none of them.

A bundle of format 3 or older holds no secrets and restores as before: no stored secret is changed, and the result says that what an app encrypted is readable only where its secrets are the ones the data was written with.

The manifest is signed, and decides the rights. The cluster signs each bundle's manifest (internal/backup/signature.go). The signature, manifest.json.sig beside bundle-info.json and in the clear, covers the manifest as manifest.json holds it, so it covers the tenant's name, the cluster's id (clusterUid) and the rights. The id is spec.clusterUID of the Cluster claim: 32 random hex characters the installer writes once into the deployments repository, so a reinstall from that repository keeps it; it reaches the operator as cluster.uid of gentian-cluster-config. A restore checks the signature with this cluster's key, never with a key the bundle names.

The rights granted in a tenant, a person's (user:<id>) among them since a restored person keeps their id, come back only when the signature holds, the bundle's cluster id is this cluster's, and the tenant restored into has the bundle's tenant's name: into a tenant made new as into the one it was taken of. From any other bundle (unsigned; signed by another key; of another cluster id or another tenant name) what was withdrawn is withdrawn, an entry naming a person is not written either way, and nothing granted comes back. Each entry left is named, status.rights.provenance says why, and a signature that does not hold (BadSignature) is said apart in the notes. An export that could not sign says so in its result.

The artifacts are not covered: the manifest names them and holds no digest of them. Anyone who knows a cluster's backup recipient, which is in every bundle-info.json, can still make a bundle that a restore opens, and a restore of it replaces the tenant's data and sets the secrets of the apps it restores to values its author chose. With a manifest of their own it brings back no granted right; with one this cluster signed for this tenant it brings back the rights this cluster recorded. A restore is run by a tenant's or the cluster's administrator, names the tenant it confirms (confirmTenant), and writes only the paths above. The artifacts are not checked, so restore only bundles whose origin is known.

The bundle signing key. Ed25519, derived from 32 random bytes the installer writes once to gentian-os/kernel/backup/signing (signing_seed, on stdin, never replaced). It is not the director's git signing key: that one signs commits to the deployments repository, and a key that signs two kinds of thing lets a signature on one pass for the other. The operator reads it from the vault itself, with its own identity (operator-write), when it writes or checks a manifest; it is never a Secret, because eso-read denies the path as it does backup/identity. It is otherwise read by the cluster-admin vault policy and by the holder of the recovery kit, which carries it (BUNDLE_SIGNING_SEED) so that a cluster rebuilt from the kit signs as before and its bundles still hold. Whoever holds it can make a bundle that brings rights into a tenant of that name on this cluster, which a platform administrator can grant there anyway. Replacing it: operations.md.

7. Write-Once Protection

Nothing the platform generates overwrites a credential that is already there.

• Kernel paths the Cluster Composition makes (database/postgresql, database/mariadb, cache/redis, storage/s3, identity/keycloak-bootstrap, authz/openfga, mail/postfix, mail/dovecot, oidc/openbao) and the platform tenant's desktop database credential beside them (tenants/platform/apps/shell/database) are managed with

  managementPolicies: ["Observe", "Create"]

  so Crossplane creates the path on first reconcile and observes it afterwards. The installer adds keys a later release introduced to an existing path, and only the missing ones.

• Kernel paths the installer seeds are written only where the path does not exist (kv_put_once). Credentials a person supplies are written as given on each run. gentian-os/kernel/llm is written on every run, because it also carries addresses that follow the settings; under random the keys it already holds are read first and written back unchanged, and the run stops if the path cannot be read.

• Per-app paths are written by the operator with OpenBao's check-and-set (cas=0, PutOnce), which refuses a second write.

Changing a credential is therefore a deliberate act in OpenBao (§9). This protects against the state-drift reset that locks out running apps.

One act of the platform replaces a stored value: a restore sets an app's own secrets to the ones its bundle holds (§6.4, ReplaceAppSecret). It is asked for, confirmed with the tenant's name, and reaches the app's own secrets only.

8. Two Secret Delivery Patterns

Both begin with an ExternalSecret that ESO turns into a Kubernetes Secret.

Pattern	Mechanism	Used by
A	The chart is told the Secret's name (existingSecret or its equivalent) and reads it itself	Kernel services whose charts support it
B	provider-helm reads single keys of the Secret into chart values (set[].valueFrom.secretKeyRef)	Every app installed from a profile: the operator renders the Secret <app>-sensitive-values and maps its keys to the value names in the profile's package.valueMapping

Both keep secrets out of Git and CR specs. With B the value ends up in the Helm release's own stored values, which is a Secret in the app's namespace.

9. Credential Rotation and Pod Restart

There is no rotation command and no schedule. A credential is changed by writing the new value in OpenBao; ESO copies it into the Kubernetes Secret within its refresh interval (one hour for an app's Secret), and Stakater Reloader rolls a workload annotated with reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true" whose Secret changed.

The operator Deployment and a few kernel services carry the annotation. The operator adds it to no tenant Release, so an app is rolled only where its profile sets the annotation in its own chart values; otherwise it needs a manual roll. The service the credential belongs to — a database role, a Keycloak client — has to be given the new value as well; nothing does that for a changed path.

Rotation in random mode

One kernel credential can be changed on its own, by hand as above.

Rotation in derived mode

A changed value in OpenBao holds, because nothing overwrites it (§7), but it is no longer what the master password reproduces: a rebuild from the master password and the salt returns the old one. Changing the master password changes nothing on a running cluster for the same reason. Where a credential must be rotated and survive a rebuild, use random mode and a backup of OpenBao. An app's credentials follow the mode as the kernel's do (§6.3).

10. Secret Flow Sequence

11. What Never Touches Git

• The master password and its salt. On the cluster they are in OpenBao and in one Secret in kernel-provisioning; off it, in the recovery kit.
• Any value under gentian-os/kernel/* or gentian-os/tenants/*/**.
• Any TLS private key.
• The DNS provider's API token.

Everything else (claims, profiles, Compositions, manifests) is plaintext-safe and committed to Git.

11.1 Matrix service accounts (Element / UVS)

Tenant users sign in to Element over OIDC only, at their tenant's realm (id.<cluster domain>/auth/realms/<tenant>). Nothing in this repository or in the catalog's Element profile creates a Matrix service account or stores a password for one. An add-on that needs a local Synapse account for a service brings the account and its secret itself, declared under the profile's secrets, and must not be a person's credential.

12. TLS and certificates

Gentian OS terminates TLS at the edge (Envoy Gateway listeners) with certificates from cert-manager. The Cluster claim's certificates.issuerMode names the issuer: acme-dns01 (the default, and the one that can issue wildcards), acme-http01, private-ca or self-signed. The kernel's hosts (platform.<cluster domain>, id.<cluster domain>) are covered by the kernel wildcard, wildcard-kernel-tls; each tenant zone receives a certificate of its own. See multi-tenancy.md §3 for the DNS-01 layout and ACME rate-limit guidance.

12.1 Development (ACME staging)

Set certificates.acmeEnv: staging on the Cluster claim before the install. The installer applies the Let's Encrypt staging ClusterIssuers (step A-09-cluster-issuers) and writes ACME_STAGING: "true" to the gentian-kernel-services ConfigMap in kernel-control (step B-01-bootstrap-apps). Staging certificates are not trusted by browsers or by default system CA bundles.

An app that calls https://id.<cluster domain>/… from inside the cluster therefore has to be given the issuer's chain. The same mechanism serves a cluster whose issuer is self-signed or private-ca.

Mechanism	Purpose	Limitation
Secret gentian-trust-anchor-tls, key ca.crt	Mozilla's CA bundle plus the issuer chain of the kernel wildcard. The operator builds it in kernel-edge and copies it into each tenant namespace (internal/kernel/trustanchor)	For clients that honor SSL_CERT_FILE or --cacert
Same Secret, key node-extra-ca.crt	The issuer chain only, for Node.js through NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS	The platform does not set that variable: a profile that needs it sets it in its own chart values. Do not point it at ca.crt (duplicate Mozilla CAs break verification)
Same Secret, key truststore.jks	A Java truststore of the same bundle	Its password is a fixed default
The operator's render (internal/apprender)	Where ACME_STAGING is true or the cluster names a trust anchor, mounts the Secret at /opt/gentian-trust-anchor in every app installed from a profile that the platform does not place, sets REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, SSL_CERT_FILE and DENO_CERT (as extraEnvVars and in values.environment), and appends javax.net.ssl.trustStore* to javaOpts when the profile declares an OIDC client or already has javaOpts	A chart that takes none of these values is not reached

An app whose runtime honors none of these needs its own answer, in its own profile. The catalog's Element profile is one: its Composition sets Synapse's OIDC provider with discovery off, the browser's authorization_endpoint on the public identity host, and the token and userinfo endpoints on Keycloak's in-cluster address (KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL from gentian-kernel-services), so Synapse never opens TLS to the edge. It does so on every cluster, not only on staging, and also sets Synapse's use_insecure_ssl_client_just_for_testing_do_not_use on the provider.

Re-issue and refresh the trust bundle:

./install.sh --only A-09-cluster-issuers,C-03-wildcard-cert
# the operator rebuilds gentian-trust-anchor-tls and copies it into tenant namespaces

12.2 Production

Production clusters must use Let's Encrypt production issuers (or another publicly trusted CA at both ingress and origin). Concretely:

1. Leave certificates.acmeEnv at production, its default.
2. Check that gentian-kernel-services in kernel-control has ACME_STAGING: "false".
3. Do not rely on gentian-trust-anchor-tls or on an insecure client flag: the operator mounts the bundle only where the cluster is on staging or names a trust anchor of its own.
4. Verify https://id.<cluster domain>/auth/realms/<tenant>/.well-known/openid-configuration presents a chain trusted by standard clients before rolling apps that sign in over OIDC.
5. Prefer stable DNS-01 credentials and avoid reinstall loops that re-issue many wildcards per week (see multi-tenancy.md rate-limit table).

With production certificates an in-cluster OIDC client trusts id.<cluster domain> through the normal system CA store; no custom CA mount is required.

12.3 Cloudflare tunnel / orange-cloud

When traffic is proxied at Cloudflare, edge TLS and origin TLS are independent. Origin certificates from cert-manager still matter for in-cluster and direct-origin callers. Enable Total TLS (or equivalent) at the edge so multi-label tenant hostnames (chat.demo.<cluster domain>) receive edge certificates — the kernel wildcard alone is not sufficient. See multi-tenancy.md §3.

12.4 The internal CA

Every cluster has the ClusterIssuer gentian-ca, in every issuer mode. It is for TLS between the platform's own components, where nothing public has to trust the certificate -- the object store's gRPC (§2.7) is the first user. It does not change which issuer serves public names: on an acme-* cluster the wildcard and every public host stay with Let's Encrypt. On a self-signed cluster it is also the anchor of the public names; on a private-ca cluster gentian-ca is the person's own CA, from the Secret they supply, and nothing below applies.

Its key is the vault's and never leaves it. The CA is OpenBao's PKI engine at pki-internal: step B-08 generates the root there once (root/generate/internal, ECDSA P-256, ten years, path length 0; the mount's maximum lease is ten years) and never replaces it. No KV path, no Secret and no file holds the key. cert-manager does not sign: the ClusterIssuer (A-09, kernel/manifests/cert-manager/internal-ca.yaml) is a Vault issuer that sends each request's CSR to pki-internal/sign/gentian-ca. It logs in with the Kubernetes method as the ServiceAccount gentian-ca-issuer in cert-manager's namespace, which nothing runs as; cert-manager asks the API server for a token for it, with the audience vault://gentian-ca. The OpenBao role cert-manager-gentian-ca is bound to that account and audience, and its policy of the same name allows update on that one sign path and nothing else: not issue (the vault would make and hand out the key), not sign-verbatim, not the role, the CA or its keys. The role and policy are composed by the Cluster claim, as the other kernel identities at the vault are. cert-manager reaches the vault on 8200 from its controller pods (kernel-network-policies.yaml) and verifies it against the vault's own CA (§12.5).

The role gentian-ca decides what may be signed, whatever the CSR asks: the names seaweedfs-server, seaweedfs-shell and the object store's four Service names, exactly, and on a self-signed cluster also the kernel domain, the names under it and its wildcard. No other domain, IP address, URI, localhost, subdomain of an allowed name (on acme-*) or RSA key; server and client use both, since one issuer is one role. Certificates live at most 90 days, cert-manager's default; B-08 rewrites the role on every run, so it follows the issuer mode.

The CA's certificate alone is written to gentian-root-ca-tls in cert-manager's namespace (ca.crt, tls.crt; no key): the anchor a self-signed cluster hands to clients. A self-signed cluster whose CA cert-manager made before keeps it: B-08 imports it into the engine once (certificate and key on stdin, never as an argument), and the Secret is written again without the key. A reinstall of cert-manager or of the whole cluster on the same vault finds the same CA; the recovery kit, which opens the vault, reaches it.

A sealed vault signs nothing. While OpenBao is sealed, no gentian-ca certificate is issued or renewed; those already issued stay valid. cert-manager renews at two thirds of the lifetime, so a certificate has about 30 days left when its renewal starts: a vault sealed for longer than that lets the object store's certificates expire, and its gRPC stops.

Within the role's names it signs whatever it is asked for -- seaweedfs-shell is the object store's administrator -- so only the platform may ask: the Kyverno policy gentian-restrict-internal-ca (kernel/security/kyverno/policies/gentian-internal-ca.yaml) refuses a Certificate or CertificateRequest naming the ClusterIssuer gentian-ca, and an Ingress asking cert-manager's ingress-shim for it, outside the kernel and system namespaces. A system namespace counts only by its name (system-*) and its tier label together. The object store's two certificates in system-s3 are its only users. The tenant AppProject does not allow ClusterIssuers, so a tenant's apps cannot replace gentian-ca either, and its only destinations are tenant-*: the Argo CD namespace, a kernel namespace and outside the policy, is not one.

A tenant's apps may still write Namespace objects, so the namespace labels the platform's policies trust have a guard of their own that is not Kyverno, since the kernel tier is what Kyverno skips: the ValidatingAdmissionPolicy gentian-namespace-tier (kernel/bootstrap/chart/templates/namespace-tier-guard.yaml, applied by B-01). Each label set has its own writers. gentianos.io/tier: the installer's own user (kubectl auth whoami, passed in at render), provider-kubernetes (system and tenant namespaces) and the operator (a tenant's DMZ). gentianos.io/function, which policies select a function's namespace by: the installer and provider-kubernetes. The mac-waiver.gentianos.io/* labels, the namespace half of a pod-security waiver: the operator alone. system:masters may write all three. Argo CD's application controller and provider-helm, under either of its identities, are refused: they apply what tenants supply, and nothing of the platform's they apply writes these labels. A write that leaves a set as it was passes for anyone. Built-in admission, so Kubernetes 1.30 or newer, which pre-flight's 1.33 covers. Shown against an API server (internal/controller/namespace_tier_guard_test.go).

A tenant's chart is installed as an account that holds rights in tenant namespaces only. provider-helm stays cluster-admin for the kernel's charts, some of which ship ClusterRoles. A tenant's Releases (the operator's, and those a profile's own Composition renders) name the ProviderConfig tenant-apps instead, whose kubeconfig (written by B-05, no credential in it) makes provider-helm act as the ServiceAccount provider-helm-tenant-apps. That account is bound to gentian-tenant-apps-helm by a RoleBinding the operator keeps in each namespace of the tenant tier named tenant-*, and nowhere else (tenant_apps_helm.go). The role allows ConfigMaps, Secrets, Services, ServiceAccounts, PersistentVolumeClaims, Deployments, StatefulSets, Jobs, Ingresses, Roles and RoleBindings, and reads Pods and ReplicaSets for Helm's wait: what the catalog's tenant charts render (Docmost, Element's Synapse, Mathesar, Nextcloud and its MCP server, Odoo, Open WebUI, OpenProject, XWiki). None renders anything at cluster scope or in another namespace. A chart's own Roles are held by escalation prevention to a subset of that role. So a tenant chart cannot create a cluster-scoped object, write or read another namespace, or touch the NetworkPolicies, quota, limits, routes and external secrets of its own; a kind beyond the list fails its install, forbidden, and is added to the role on review. The binding keeps a finalizer until no Release installs into its namespace, so a tenant's releases can be uninstalled while its namespace is deleted. Shown against an API server (tenant_apps_helm_envtest_test.go).

What this does not close: provider-helm is one cluster-admin process, and which identity a Release gets is the ProviderConfig it names. A profile bundle's own Composition (app-<profile>, Element's in the catalog) names it for each object itself, and nothing refuses the kernel's: Element's installs Synapse as tenant-apps, and its other objects through the kernel's provider-kubernetes account. provider-helm reads a Release's values, pull secret and patches as itself, from any namespace the Release names.

12.5 The vault's own TLS

OpenBao serves TLS from a certificate, openbao-tls, that a CA of its own signs: openbao-ca in the secrets namespace, self-signed, ten years, its key kept on renewal (kernel/bootstrap/chart/templates/vault-tls.yaml). Every client verifies the vault against that CA's certificate, ca.crt: External Secrets' stores, the custodian, and cert-manager's internal-CA issuer through openbao-ca-bundle, a copy of the certificate alone that B-01 writes to cert-manager's namespace (a ClusterIssuer reads Secrets only there). The serving certificate renews every 60 days with a new key without any client noticing.

The operator and provider-vault verify the vault against the same certificate, through copies B-01 writes to their namespaces as well (openbao-ca-bundle, mounted as BAO_CACERT and VAULT_CACERT). The installer reads ca.crt from the cluster before it calls the vault and verifies its bao and curl calls against it under the certificate's name openbao.<secrets>.svc (openbao_cli_trust, bao_curl), since it reaches the vault at a ClusterIP or a port-forward. Only before B-01 has made the CA, when nothing answers on the vault's address, does it not verify.

The vault reads its certificate files only when it starts or on SIGHUP, and its StatefulSet updates OnDelete. A sidecar in the vault's pod, tls-reload, watches the mounted tls.crt and sends SIGHUP to bao when it changes: it shares the pod's process namespace, runs as the vault's uid with no capabilities, a read-only root and no service-account token, and so can also read the vault process's memory and environment, as the vault's own container can. B-01 still signals after a new certificate has reached the pod and records which certificate it was told about; it never restarts the vault, which would seal it until the seal unseals it. The custodian reads the CA once, at start, and B-01 restarts it when the CA has changed.

13. Licensing summary

• In use, Apache 2.0: Keycloak, OpenFGA, Kyverno, Envoy Gateway, Crossplane, Argo CD, cert-manager, External Secrets Operator.
• In use, MPL 2.0: OpenBao.
• Considered, not used: SpiceDB, Ory, OPA, NetBox, Cilium, SPIRE (Apache 2.0); Zitadel v3+, Permify, Snipe-IT (AGPL-3.0, copyleft — disclose service-side modifications); GLPI (GPL).
• Recommendation: the Keycloak + OpenFGA core is fully Apache 2.0, so a modified IdP/authZ engine can be shipped and operated without a copyleft obligation on the modifications. Both are self-hosted, which keeps the identity layer independent of any vendor. Zitadel remains the alternative if native multi-tenancy outweighs the AGPL constraint and you don't need to consume upstream SAML.

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14. Caveats

• Dual-write consistency: membership lives in Keycloak and is projected into OpenFGA from events, which leaves a window and, if an event is lost, a difference nothing repairs (§3.0).
• Operational cost: Keycloak (JVM) + OpenFGA + OpenBao + the MAC backbone is more moving parts than a single binary. Budget DevOps capacity.